Juan Fuentes v. Loretta E. Lynch
837 F.3d 966
9th Cir.2016Background
- Petitioner Juan Carlos Fuentes entered the U.S. without inspection in 1996 and became an LPR in 2004.
- To qualify for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2), he needed seven years of continuous U.S. residence after being “admitted in any status.”
- Fuentes’ continuous residence ended in 2009 due to a controlled-substance offense, so he lacked seven years after his 2004 LPR admission.
- Fuentes argued he should be treated as having been “admitted in any status” earlier because (1) he was listed as a derivative beneficiary on his mother’s asylum and NACARA applications, and (2) he received U.S. work authorization under 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c).
- The BIA rejected those contentions; Fuentes also raised but did not present to the BIA a claim based on seven years of presence tied to his own NACARA application.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the BIA: it held Fuentes was not “admitted in any status” before his 2004 LPR grant and dismissed the unexhausted NACARA-based claim for lack of jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Fuentes’ Argument | Lynch’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether being a derivative beneficiary on a parent’s asylum/NACARA application counts as being “admitted in any status” for § 1229b(a)(2) | Being listed as a derivative beneficiary and associated benefits should count as admission for continuous-residence calculation | Derivative beneficiary status and related toleration/benefits do not equal statutory "admission" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) | Not admitted; derivative beneficiary listing does not satisfy “admitted in any status” (petition denied on this claim) |
| Whether receiving employment authorization under 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c) constitutes being “admitted in any status” | Work authorization demonstrates lawful status or sufficient recognition to count as admission | Work authorization under § 274a.12(c) alone does not convert presence into an admission | Not admitted; § 274a.12(c) authorization insufficient to establish admission |
| Applicability of precedent (Garcia-Quintero and Garcia) versus BIA rulings (In re Reza-Murillo) and Medina-Nunez | Garcia-Quintero/Garcia suggest some nontraditional statuses may count as admission | Medina-Nunez (Chevron-deference to Reza-Murillo) forecloses treating FUP or comparable non-admissions as "admitted" | Medina-Nunez controls; Chevron deference to Reza-Murillo means those non-admissions do not count |
| Whether Fuentes’ NACARA-based seven years claim can be reviewed by the court | Fuentes maintains NACARA evidence establishes seven years and thus admission earlier | Government argues the NACARA-based theory was not presented to the BIA and is unexhausted | Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies |
Key Cases Cited
- Medina-Nunez v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2015) (affirms Chevron deference to BIA holding that FUP acceptance is not an "admission")
- Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (held FUP participants were "admitted in any status" for cancellation)
- Garcia v. Holder, 659 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir. 2011) (held SIJ parolees qualify as "admitted in any status" for cancellation)
- Vasquez de Alcantar v. Holder, 645 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2011) (application filing does not itself change immigration status)
- Guevara v. Holder, 649 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2011) (work authorization under certain regulatory provisions does not establish admission)
- Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456 (9th Cir. 1985) (asylum applicants’ tolerated presence does not equal legitimated admission)
- Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2010) (federal courts lack jurisdiction to review claims not presented to the BIA)