Juan Carlos Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.
993 F.3d 1266
11th Cir.2021Background
- Winn-Dixie operates physical grocery stores (including pharmacies) and a limited-use website that does not sell goods online but allows customers to request prescription refills for in-store pickup and to link manufacturer digital coupons to a rewards card.
- Plaintiff Juan Carlos Gil is legally blind and uses screen‑reader software; he could not access roughly 90% of Winn‑Dixie’s website and therefore could not use the online refill or coupon‑linking features.
- Gil stopped shopping at Winn‑Dixie, sued under Title III of the ADA seeking injunctive relief to make the website accessible, and after a bench trial the district court found an ADA violation and enjoined Winn‑Dixie to conform to WCAG 2.0 and take related measures.
- Winn‑Dixie appealed, raising standing, whether websites are "places of public accommodation" under Title III, and whether the website’s inaccessibility violated Title III (including the injunction).
- The Eleventh Circuit (majority) held Gil had Article III standing, ruled that Title III’s text limits "public accommodations" to physical places (so the website is not a place of public accommodation), and concluded on these facts the website did not create the kind of intangible barrier under Title III that violated the ADA; it vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing | Gil alleged concrete injury from inability to access website and deterrence from returning to stores. | No injury: Gil previously used physical stores without impediment. | Gil has Article III standing; inability to use site is a concrete, particularized injury and a credible risk of future injury. |
| Is a website a "place of public accommodation" under Title III? | Website either is a place of public accommodation or is sufficiently tied to physical stores to be covered. | Title III’s statutory definition lists physical places only; websites are not "places." | Title III’s text unambiguously refers to physical locations; websites are not places of public accommodation. |
| Does an inaccessible website violate Title III as an "intangible barrier" / failure to provide auxiliary aids? | Website inaccessibility functions as an intangible barrier and, lacking auxiliary aids (screen‑reader compatibility), denies full and equal enjoyment of in‑store privileges (privacy, speed, coupon linking). | Winn‑Dixie’s site is limited‑use, not a point of sale, and all services must be completed in‑store; the inaccessibility does not exclude or deny access to the physical stores’ goods/services. | On these facts the website did not act as an intangible barrier to access the physical stores’ goods/services; no Title III violation under §12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) as applied here. |
| Remedy / Injunction | Requested permanent injunction requiring WCAG 2.0 compliance and related policies/training. | Challenged injunction as improper given legal error on liability and remedy scope. | Court vacated the district court’s final judgment and injunction and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir.) (recognizes that Title III covers "intangible barriers" such as discriminatory procedures and screening mechanisms)
- Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 913 F.3d 898 (9th Cir.) (applies ADA to website/app tied to physical restaurants and employs a nexus analysis)
- A.L. by & through D.L. v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts US, Inc., 900 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir.) (uses a "like experience" / comparable treatment inquiry for necessary accommodations)
- PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (U.S. Sup. Ct.) (discusses the scope of reasonable versus necessary modifications under the ADA)
- Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249 (U.S. Sup. Ct.) (canon that statutory text controls when unambiguous)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (U.S. Sup. Ct.) (standing requires a concrete and particularized injury)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (U.S. Sup. Ct.) (injunctive‑relief standing requires past injury and real/immediate threat of future injury)