JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Thomas N. Campbell, Christy W. Kolva, Foster Management LLC, Foster Timber, LTD, Neil F. Campbell Jr., Robin S. Rouse, Terrill A. Scatena, and Sabrina Rouse, 09-20-00161-CV

Background

Letitia Foster Campbell’s 1946 LFC 46 Trust (created in California) holds timberlands in Texas; JPMorgan Chase is the current trustee and holds a 99% limited-partnership interest in Foster Timber while Foster Management (owned by five grandchildren) manages operations.
In 2018–2019 family members initiated litigation and arbitration over dissolution and management of the Texas timber entities; JPMorgan appeared in the suit as a nominal defendant and later filed a declaratory-judgment petition in Texas seeking relief related to arbitration.
Plaintiffs (Thomas, Christy, Foster Timber, Foster Management) later filed a counterclaim in March 2020 seeking judicial modification/reformation of the LFC 46 Trust under Tex. Prop. Code § 112.054; JPMorgan then filed a special appearance contesting Texas personal jurisdiction over that counterclaim.
The trial court denied JPMorgan’s special appearance on the ground JPMorgan had waived jurisdictional objections by making a general appearance and filing affirmative pleadings earlier; the court separately granted JPMorgan’s plea to the jurisdiction on the same claims.
On interlocutory appeal, the Ninth Court of Appeals held the trust-modification counterclaim was severable (so JPMorgan had not waived its special appearance) and that Foster failed to prove that JPMorgan had minimum contacts with Texas sufficient for specific jurisdiction.
The court reversed the denial of JPMorgan’s special appearance and rendered that the Texas court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over JPMorgan with respect to the trust-modification counterclaim; the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether JPMorgan waived its right to contest personal jurisdiction by earlier general appearance and by filing a declaratory-judgment action	JPMorgan’s earlier filings fixed venue and invoked the court’s processes, so it waived a later special appearance as to related trust issues	The trust-modification counterclaim is a severable, new and independent claim under Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a, so JPMorgan did not waive its right to challenge jurisdiction for that claim	Court: Counterclaim is severable; JPMorgan did not waive the special appearance
Whether Texas courts have specific jurisdiction over JPMorgan for the trust-modification claim	JPMorgan has substantial contacts with Texas: trust corpus (timber) is located in Texas, JPMorgan solicited appointment as trustee, received distributions from Texas timber, and sent representatives to Texas	JPMorgan is a passive, out-of-state trustee administering the trust from Illinois; it does not manage day-to-day Texas operations, the trust was created/modified in California, beneficiaries largely lived outside Texas, and its contacts are insufficient for purposeful availment	Court: Foster failed to prove minimum contacts establishing specific jurisdiction; no jurisdiction over JPMorgan for the trust-modification counterclaim

Key Cases Cited

Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. 2010) (standard of review and presumption of fact findings when trial court issues no findings)
Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142 (Tex. 2013) (burden-shifting in long-arm/jurisdiction analysis and minimum contacts requirement)
Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. 2007) (purposeful availment framework for specific jurisdiction)
Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S. Ct. 1017 (U.S. 2021) (recent Supreme Court guidance on specific jurisdiction and the required affiliation between forum and underlying controversy)
Kelly v. General Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. 2010) (plaintiff’s pleading burden for long-arm jurisdiction)
BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2002) (procedural posture and special appearance principles)
F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez, 237 S.W.3d 680 (Tex. 2007) (standard for severability of claims under Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a)
Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. 2005) (financial benefits from forum alone do not establish jurisdiction)
Zac Smith & Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 734 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1987) (personal jurisdiction where nonresidents’ activities were directly related to Texas enterprise)
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (U.S. 1985) (purposeful availment and foreseeability in jurisdictional analysis)