JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Sofia Borquez, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate Of Cresencio Borquez, Mercedes Borquez, Individually, and Joel Borquez, Individually, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 11303

Brink’s armored-guard Cresencio Borquez was fatally shot while servicing an outdoor Chase ATM on Sept. 18, 2009; assailants were Enrique Lopez and an accomplice.
Plaintiffs (Borquez’s estate/family) sued Chase for negligence and premises liability, alleging Chase failed to provide adequate security given prior crimes and crime statistics.
At trial the jury found Chase 100% liable and awarded about $4.34 million; Chase appealed arguing no duty existed and other trial errors.
Relevant prior incidents: two armed robberies at the same Chase branch in 2006 (no injuries), GMR and Dallas PD area crime reports for 2005–2008/2009, and a February 2009 armored-car robbery several months before the shooting.
Chase had categorized the branch as high-risk after the 2006 robberies and installed bullet-resistant glass; Chase’s corporate rep testified the branch remained high-risk.
The court of appeals reversed: it held as a matter of law that Chase owed no duty to protect Borquez because the risk of violent crime on the premises was not foreseeable.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Chase owed a duty to protect Borquez from third-party criminal acts	Borquez’s death was foreseeable from prior on-site robberies, area crime statistics, the 2009 armored-car robbery, Chase’s own risk rating, and statutory ATM-safety requirements	No duty as a matter of law because prior incidents were too remote or dissimilar, area statistics lack geographic specificity, and foreseeability was not shown	Court held no duty: the risk of violent crime on these premises was not foreseeable as a matter of law; reversed and rendered for Chase

Timberwalk Apts. Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. 1998) (landowner owes duty to protect invitees from third-party crime only if it knew or should have known of an unreasonable, foreseeable risk; set out proximity/recency/frequency/similarity/publicity factors)
Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762 (Tex. 2010) (duty may arise from immediate, apparent, imminent risk—narrow, fact-specific holding where owner knew a violent brawl was imminent)
Park v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 429 S.W.3d 142 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014) (applying Timberwalk factors and holding no duty where prior violent crimes were not sufficiently frequent, recent, or similar)
Trammell Crow Cent. Tex., Ltd. v. Gutierrez, 267 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. 2008) (analysis of foreseeability of third-party criminal acts; used two-year frame for recency)
Mellon Mortg. Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. 1999) (area crime statistics within a confined radius, together with other evidence, can constitute some evidence that violent conduct was foreseeable)
QuikTrip Corp. v. Goodwin, 449 S.W.3d 665 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014) (existence of duty is question of law when material facts are undisputed; expert testimony cannot create duty where none exists)