Joyce D. Higgs v. Costa Crociere S.P.A. Company, 969 F.3d 1295

On Dec. 24, 2014, Joyce Higgs tripped over a Costa Luminosa cleaning bucket in a crowded buffet area and fractured her left humerus; she sued Costa Crociere under maritime negligence law.
At the second trial a jury found Costa liable, assessed Higgs 15% comparative fault, and awarded roughly $1.1 million (including $61,000 for past medical expenses, which matched the providers’ billed amounts).
Costa repeatedly failed timely to disclose: (a) the identity of its investigator Kavita Kamble and (b) photographs she took; a magistrate judge had ordered production and the court later found Costa produced the photos late and concealed the investigator’s identity.
The district court imposed a permissive adverse-inference instruction as a discovery sanction, permitted Higgs’s counsel to emphasize Costa’s concealment, and denied Costa’s renewed JMOL motion that argued Higgs failed to show notice of the hazard.
Post-verdict the district court reduced the past-medical award from the jury’s figure (~$61,000) to the amount actually paid by the insurer and Higgs (~$16,000); Higgs cross-appealed that reduction.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed liability and the discovery sanction rulings, but held the court erred in reducing medical damages as a matter of law and remanded to reinstate the jury’s reasonable-value award (subject to comparative-negligence discount).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Notice of hazard (JMOL)	Higgs: testimony and circumstantial evidence show Costa employees placed bucket behind corner and knew/should have known of tripping danger.	Costa: no evidence of actual or constructive notice; insufficient proof to support liability.	Court: Affirmed—reasonable jurors could find actual or constructive notice from eyewitness testimony, employee practices, and corporate admissions.
Discovery sanctions & trial fairness (adverse inference; counsel argument; new trial)	Higgs: Costa deliberately concealed Kamble/photos; sanction and argument were appropriate and limited.	Costa: late production was benign or inadvertent; adverse instruction and emphasis at trial prejudiced Costa and justify new trial.	Court: Affirmed—district court did not abuse discretion; found bad-faith discovery violations; permissive adverse-inference instruction was a restrained, proper sanction; no plain error from counsel’s statements.
Measure of past medical damages (cross-appeal)	Higgs: jury may consider full billed amount; reasonable value should be determined by jury considering billed and paid figures.	Costa: recovery should be limited as a matter of law to the amount actually paid/settled (to avoid windfalls).	Court: Reversed district court reduction—adopted rule that jury should determine reasonable value considering all relevant evidence (billed amounts, amounts paid, expert testimony); categorical cap at amount paid is error.

Kornberg v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 741 F.2d 1332 (11th Cir.) (shipowner duty and maritime negligence principles)
Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Line, 867 F.2d 1318 (11th Cir.) (notice required for premises-liability under maritime law)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (standard for judgment as a matter of law; draw inferences for nonmoving party)
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (inherent power to sanction bad-faith litigation conduct)
Bourque v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 623 F.2d 351 (5th Cir.) (application of collateral-source rule in admiralty)
ML Healthcare Servs., LLC v. Publix Super Markets, 881 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir.) (jurors are presumed to follow court instructions about not offsetting third-party payments)
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996) (maritime law as judge-made federal common law)
Pickett v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 420 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir.) (JMOL legal standard)