Joyanna Lymon v. Karen Freedland
153701
| Mich. | Dec 8, 2017Background
- Joyanna Lymon, a home health aide, slipped on a steep, icy driveway while approaching her patient’s house on January 4, 2013 and fractured her leg.
- Four other visitors had walked up snow-covered grass beside the driveway to reach the house; they noted a large bush partially obstructed that path and that the top portion of the driveway must be used to reach the door.
- Lymon sued homeowners (Freedland) for negligent maintenance of the driveway; defendants moved for summary disposition asserting the danger was open and obvious so they owed no duty.
- The trial court denied summary disposition; the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, finding issues of fact about special aspects of the open-and-obvious condition.
- The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal by a plurality order; Chief Justice Markman dissented, urging review to clarify when an open-and-obvious hazard contains a “special aspect” (especially “effectively unavoidable”).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the steep, icy driveway effectively unavoidable? | Lymon: she needed to reach patient and could not reasonably avoid the icy driveway. | Freedland: alternative route (snow-covered grass) existed; hazard was open and obvious. | Trial court/Ct of Appeals: factual issues precluded dismissal; Supreme Court denied leave (no majority). Dissent would review. |
| Did the open-and-obvious doctrine bar recovery? | Lymon: despite obviousness, a "special aspect" (effective unavoidability/unreasonable danger) may impose duty. | Freedland: obvious condition, no duty to warn or remedy. | Ct of Appeals: question of special aspect requires factfinder; summary disposition improper; Supreme Court denied leave. |
| When does an open-and-obvious condition have a "special aspect"? | Lymon: driveway’s steepness/ice created special aspect making hazard effectively unavoidable or unreasonably dangerous. | Freedland: everyday conditions (ice, steps) are not inherently special aspects absent unique circumstances. | No definitive clarification from Supreme Court; dissent urged guidance distinguishing unreasonably dangerous vs. effectively unavoidable. |
| Is the proper test whether special aspect exists when condition is either unreasonably dangerous or effectively unavoidable? | Lymon: either category can create duty. | Freedland: courts should be cautious expanding "special aspect" beyond severe hazards. | Lower court treated categories disjunctively; dissent urged Supreme Court to refine analysis. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bertrand v Alan Ford, 449 Mich 606 (discusses duty to invitees and open-and-obvious exception)
- Lugo v Ameritech Corp, 464 Mich 512 (special-aspect concept; substantial risk of severe injury example)
- Hoffner v Lanctoe, 492 Mich 450 (explains effective unavoidability and limits on invitee-focused protections)
- Lymon v Freedland, 314 Mich App 746 (Ct App opinion affirming denial of summary disposition)
- Fowler v Menard, 500 Mich 862 (related Supreme Court decision referenced during briefing)