Joy Laskar, PH.D. v. Phillip W. Hurd
972 F.3d 1278
| 11th Cir. | 2020Background
- Joy Laskar, a Georgia Tech professor and director of a research center, was accused in an internal audit of misusing institute funds and resources to benefit a private company he founded; the audit was led by Phillip Hurd and included auditor Patrick Jenkins, and was requested by administrators Jilda Garton and Mark Allen.
- Hurd and Jenkins’ audit formed the primary basis for a law-enforcement affidavit that secured arrest and search warrants; officers executed the warrants, seized property, and arrested Laskar.
- The state later indicted Laskar for racketeering and theft; the indictment was dismissed by the state trial court as time-barred (statute of limitations).
- Laskar sued the four Georgia Tech officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for malicious prosecution (Fourth Amendment), alleging they knowingly or recklessly supplied false or misleading information to law enforcement and prosecutors.
- The district court dismissed the complaint, holding the statute-of-limitations dismissal was not a "favorable termination" and granting qualified immunity; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
- The Eleventh Circuit held a formal dismissal for untimeliness can satisfy the favorable-termination element and that Laskar plausibly alleged Hurd and Jenkins (but not Garton and Allen) caused a Fourth Amendment violation and are not entitled to qualified immunity at this stage.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a dismissal as untimely (statute of limitations) is a "favorable termination" for § 1983 malicious-prosecution accrual | Laskar: a formal dismissal terminated the prosecution in his favor and satisfies the favorable-termination element | Officials: an untimely dismissal does not indicate innocence and therefore is not a favorable termination | Court: A formal end that is not inconsistent with the plaintiff's innocence on at least one charge authorizes his confinement; dismissal as untimely counts as a favorable termination (unless conviction/admission on all relevant charges) |
| Whether officials initiated proceedings without probable cause and with malice | Laskar: officials knowingly/recklessly provided false or materially incomplete information that produced the affidavit and arrest | Officials: no lack of probable cause, no malice, or they did not supply the false information used to obtain the warrant | Court: Allegations suffice for Hurd and Jenkins (they prepared/report relied upon); allegations insufficient as to Garton and Allen (no alleged intentional/reckless false statements to warrant affiant) |
| Causation — did defendants cause Laskar's seizure? | Laskar: the audit and report were the but-for and proximate cause of the arrest warrant and seizure | Officials: any later indictment was attenuated; their actions did not cause the seizure | Court: False statements/material omissions that were necessary to the warrant affidavit are the relevant causal link; Laskar alleged such materiality, so causation is pleaded for Hurd and Jenkins |
| Qualified immunity / clearly established law | Laskar: law clearly prohibits knowingly/recklessly making material misstatements in warrant affidavits | Hurd & Jenkins: entitled to qualified immunity because right not clearly established as to these facts | Court: Precedent (Franks, Eleventh Circuit cases) made it clearly established that knowingly/recklessly providing false material in a warrant affidavit violates the Fourth Amendment; Hurd and Jenkins not entitled to immunity at pleading stage; claims vs. Garton and Allen dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147 (11th Cir. 2020) (defines § 1983 malicious-prosecution elements and standards for probable cause and material misstatements in warrant affidavits)
- Uboh v. Reno, 141 F.3d 1000 (11th Cir. 1998) (discusses favorable-termination as an element of § 1983 malicious-prosecution claims)
- Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (provides rule that knowingly false statements in warrant affidavits can invalidate probable cause)
- Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) (clarifies malicious-prosecution claims arise under the Fourth Amendment and common law guides § 1983 definitions)
- Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019) (instructs courts to identify common-law principles well settled at the time § 1983 was enacted when defining § 1983 claims)
- Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999) (holds officials violate the Fourth Amendment by knowingly or recklessly making false statements necessary to probable cause)
- District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) (summarizes qualified-immunity "clearly established" standard)
- Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544 (11th Cir. 1994) (recognizes nominal damages are available for § 1983 malicious-prosecution claims)