990 N.W.2d 800
Iowa2023Background
- Feb. 16, 2013: a woman (L.M.) was raped in an Iowa City house; forensic swabs showed two male DNA contributors—one matched Ryan Markley and the other later matched Joshua Venckus.
- Venckus maintained an alibi (he said he was in Chicago); his friends/family supported the alibi but investigators found no bus records and a purported driver failed a polygraph; Venckus replaced his cell phone the day after the attack.
- Detective Andrew Rich led the investigation, obtained Venckus’s DNA after Venckus consented, and arrested him in Jan. 2014; prosecutors charged Venckus and pursued the case through trial.
- Markley pleaded to other charges and agreed to be available but was not called at Venckus’s trial; a jury acquitted Venckus in Sept. 2016 and his record was expunged.
- Venckus sued the City and Detective Rich (malicious prosecution, abuse of process, constitutional torts) and county prosecutors; this Court earlier (Venckus I) dismissed most county claims and allowed city claims to proceed.
- On remand the district court granted summary judgment for the city defendants; this appeal challenges that ruling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Iowa recognizes a "continuing" malicious prosecution tort | Venckus: courts should recognize continuing malicious prosecution (Restatement §655) to reach defendants who keep a baseless prosecution going after probable cause has dissipated | City/Rich: Iowa law does not recognize such a distinct continuing tort; traditional malicious prosecution elements control | Court assumed (without deciding) it need not recognize the tort to resolve the case; denied Venckus relief because other defects independently defeat the claim |
| Whether probable cause existed throughout prosecution | Venckus: DNA quantity/quality and transfer theory undermine probable cause | City/Rich: DNA (including sperm on cervix), other forensic and circumstantial evidence, and lack of reliable exculpatory proof supported continuing probable cause | Held probable cause existed from arrest through trial; DNA and other evidence defeated the claim |
| Whether Detective Rich instigated or caused continuation of prosecution | Venckus: Rich actively pursued and influenced continued prosecution despite his doubts | City/Rich: Prosecutors independently controlled charging/continuation; they had the same information Rich had and believed the case should proceed | Held Rich did not cause continuation—prosecutors made charging decisions and had access to all investigative materials; lack of causation defeats claim |
| Availability of direct Iowa constitutional tort claims (art. I, §§1,8,9) | Venckus: asserts direct damages claims under Iowa Constitution for liberty, movement, due process, unreasonable seizure | City/Rich: such direct constitutional tort claims are not available against municipalities/municipal employees; alternative immunity defenses apply | Held direct constitutional damages claims are not available (relying on Burnett); summary judgment for city defendants affirmed on these claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Venckus v. City of Iowa City, 930 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 2019) (prior appeal addressing immunity and pleading issues)
- Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d 844 (Iowa 2017) (standards for certain direct constitutional claims)
- Linn v. Montgomery, 903 N.W.2d 337 (Iowa 2017) (elements of malicious prosecution)
- Sisler v. City of Centerville, 372 N.W.2d 248 (Iowa 1985) (adopting Restatement probable cause standard)
- Liberty Loan Corp. of Des Moines v. Williams, 201 N.W.2d 462 (Iowa 1972) (definition of malicious prosecution)
- Baldwin v. City of Estherville, 915 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 2018) (discussing municipal immunity doctrines)
- Gordon v. Noel, 356 N.W.2d 559 (Iowa 1984) (acquittal does not create presumption of lack of probable cause)
- State v. Horton, 625 N.W.2d 362 (Iowa 2001) (probable cause standard for police)
- Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2009) (continuing malicious prosecution requires insistence on proceeding after probable cause becomes lacking)