895 F.3d 515
7th Cir.2018Background
- Joshua Vasquez and Miguel Cardona are convicted child-sex offenders living in Chicago and subject to Illinois residency restrictions that bar living within 500 feet of schools, playgrounds, child-care centers, and (after a 2008 amendment) day-care homes and group day-care homes.
- In August 2016 the Chicago Police Department notified Vasquez and Cardona that nearby day-care homes fell within the 500-foot buffer and gave them 30 days to move; both sued seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
- They asserted four constitutional claims: (1) Ex Post Facto violation (retroactive punishment); (2) Fifth Amendment taking; (3) procedural due process (right to an individualized hearing/assessment); and (4) substantive due process (including a contention that heightened scrutiny should apply).
- The district court enjoined enforcement during the case but dismissed the complaint on the pleadings; the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal.
- The panel held: the 2008 amendment is not retroactive/punitive under Smith and Leach; the takings claim is unexhausted and fails on the merits because the amendment predated plaintiffs’ property interests; no procedural due-process right exists to a factfinding hearing for a statutory rule; and the statute survives rational-basis review for substantive due process.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ex Post Facto Clause: Does applying the 2008 addition to day-care homes to pre-enactment offenders impose retroactive punishment? | Amendment retroactively punishes by restricting where pre-2008 offenders may live. | The law creates prospective regulatory obligations and is nonpunitive. | Held: No ex post facto violation — statute is prospective and civil (Smith; Leach). |
| Takings Clause: Does the residency restriction effect a taking requiring compensation? | The restriction deprives plaintiffs of use/value of their homes and investment-backed expectations. | Plaintiffs failed to exhaust state remedies; amendment existed before property interests arose, so no reasonable expectation defeated. | Held: Dismissed — unexhausted under Williamson County; on the merits fails under Penn Central (expectations defeated because law predated acquisition). |
| Procedural Due Process: Are plaintiffs entitled to an individualized hearing to prove current dangerousness? | They are entitled to a hearing to contest continued risk before being forced to move. | Statute applies categorically; due process does not require a hearing to establish a fact irrelevant to the statute. | Held: No hearing required — Connecticut Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe controls; fact is not material. |
| Substantive Due Process / Level of Scrutiny: Does the statute violate substantive due process or require heightened scrutiny? | Plaintiffs argue animus and interference with right to establish a home, warranting heightened scrutiny. | Law is neutral, serves legitimate/compelling interest (protecting children), and is rationally related to that interest. | Held: Rational-basis only; statute is rationally related to protecting children and survives substantive-due-process challenge. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Leach, 639 F.3d 769 (7th Cir.) (SORNA creates prospective regulatory obligations; not punitive)
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (sex-offender registry is civil and nonpunitive under Ex Post Facto analysis)
- Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (multi-factor test for regulatory takings)
- Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (state-court exhaustion requirement for takings claims)
- Connecticut Dep’t of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) (no due-process hearing required to prove a fact not material to a statutory scheme)
- Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (regulation restricting uses of property does not necessarily effect a taking)
- Goodpaster v. City of Indianapolis, 736 F.3d 1060 (7th Cir. 2013) (reasonable-expectation inquiry considers existing regulations when purchased)
- Rancho de Calistoga v. City of Calistoga, 800 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2015) (buyers in regulated fields are on notice of regulation when entering market)