Joshua R. Walker v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), 05A02-1607-CR-1584

Joshua R. Walker and his girlfriend were primary caregivers for newborn B.W.; doctors found multiple skull and rib fractures (some healing), possible leg fractures, liver laceration, retinal hemorrhaging, and brain fluid—injuries consistent with abuse.
Only Walker, Burress, Walker’s sister, and two friends had been alone with the child since birth; the child suffered for weeks without medical treatment.
Walker was initially charged with Level 5 felony neglect of a dependent; he ultimately pleaded guilty to Level 6 felony neglect with sentencing left to the court.
At sentencing the trial court found several mitigators (no criminal history, military service, cooperation with DCS, low risk to reoffend) and one primary aggravator: the extent/severity and prolonged nature of the infant’s injuries and suffering.
The court imposed an executed two-and-one-half year sentence (advisory one year plus 1.5 years for aggravators). Walker appealed, arguing the court improperly used elements of the offense as aggravators.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by using crime elements as aggravators to exceed the advisory sentence	State: The court properly relied on the particularly brutal nature and circumstances of the crime as aggravating, not merely statutory elements	Walker: The court impermissibly considered elements of neglect (the dependent’s injury and suffering) as aggravators to increase sentence	Affirmed. The court concluded the judge relied on the uniquely severe facts and circumstances (extent, duration, and callousness) rather than material elements of the offense, so using them as aggravators was proper

Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. 2007) (standard for appellate review of sentencing and what constitutes an abuse of discretion)
Kimbrough v. State, 979 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. 2012) (clarifies Anglemyer sentencing-statement error categories)
Gomillia v. State, 13 N.E.3d 846 (Ind. 2014) (trial court may not rely on material elements of the offense as aggravators unless unique circumstances justify deviation)
Blount v. State, 22 N.E.3d 559 (Ind. 2014) (time range in charging instrument is not a material element when time is not otherwise an element)
Hall v. State, 870 N.E.2d 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (nature and circumstances significantly more heinous than typical may be proper aggravators)