Joshua Jacobs v. State
506 S.W.3d 127
| Tex. App. | 2016Background
- Joshua Jacobs was convicted by a Bowie County jury of aggravated sexual assault of a child for unlawful contact with a 12-year-old; after pleading true to a prior Louisiana felony conviction, the trial court imposed a mandatory life sentence.
- During pretrial voir dire Jacobs sought to ask commitment questions referencing "an unrelated sexual offense" under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure art. 38.37 to determine whether jurors would still require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the charged offense.
- The trial court prohibited Jacobs from using the term "sexual offense," allowing only the more generic terms "assaultive offense," "unrelated offense," or "felony offense." Jacobs objected, arguing the restriction prevented him from probing juror bias and preserving challenges for cause.
- The State argued the restriction was to avoid "poisoning the panel" and because Article 38.37 permits jurors to consider extraneous sexual-offense evidence for any bearing it has on relevant matters.
- The court of appeals held the trial court abused its discretion by barring Jacobs from asking four proper commitment questions referencing an unrelated sexual offense, found the error constitutional and harmful given the State’s heavy reliance on the extraneous-offense evidence, and reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Jacobs) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court erred by barring voir dire references to an "unrelated sexual offense" and forcing use of "assaultive offense" | Jacobs: restriction prevented meaningful commitment questions and ability to detect juror bias; deprived right to counsel/impartial jury | State: restriction was reasonable to avoid confusing or "poisoning" panel; Article 38.37 allows jurors to consider extraneous acts so defendant was seeking inconsistent commitments | Court: abused discretion; barring those questions was unduly restrictive and prejudicial |
| Whether the challenged questions were proper commitment questions | Jacobs: questions tested whether jurors would still require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of specific elements despite proof of an unrelated sexual offense | State: use of "sexual offense" would be too specific/confusing and could improperly influence jurors | Court: Questions 1,2,4,5 were proper commitment questions (met Standefer criteria); Question 3 was compound and not all parts met criteria |
| Whether the error was constitutional or nonconstitutional | Jacobs: improper limitation prevented determining cause challenges and undermined impartial jury — constitutional error | State: voir dire limits are within trial court discretion and intended to prevent prejudice | Court: error was constitutional because it prevented testing for cause; required Rule 44.2(a) analysis |
| Whether the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | Jacobs: State’s heavy reliance on extraneous-offense evidence made harm likely; defense theory was that only indecency occurred, not penetration | State: argued no abuse warranting reversal (implicit) | Court: not harmless; could not say beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not contribute to conviction; reversed and remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Easley v. State, 424 S.W.3d 535 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (clarifies when voir dire limits constitute constitutional error and frames Rule 44.2 analysis)
- Hill v. State, 426 S.W.3d 868 (Tex. App. Eastland 2014) (voir dire limits preventing testing for cause can be constitutional error)
- Standefer v. State, 59 S.W.3d 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (defines when commitment questions are proper and sets two-part test)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (due process requires proof of each element beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (addresses due-process proof standards and juror bias challenges)
- Hanson v. State, 269 S.W.3d 130 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008) (permits hypothetical voir dire about law so long as it is hypothetical and not specific to allegations)
- Snowden v. State, 353 S.W.3d 815 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (harm analysis guidance for determining whether error contributed to conviction)