Joshua Gomillia v. State of Indiana, 13 N.E.3d 846

Gomillia pleaded guilty to class A felony criminal deviate conduct and class B felony robbery as part of a plea agreement, with other charges dismissed and a cooperation clause.
The trial court sentenced Gomillia to a forty-year total executed term (forty-five years for deviate conduct with five suspended; ten years for robbery concurrent).
The court considered mitigating factors (acceptance of responsibility, remorse, lack of prior convictions, cooperation) and aggravating factors including the crime’s circumstances and Gomillia’s leadership role.
The court described the circumstances as terrifying to the victim and noted two young men entering the home with weapons as an aggravator, outweighing mitigators.
Gomillia appealed, arguing the court relied on improper factors and that the ‘nature and circumstances’ of the crime used elements of the offenses as aggravators; Court of Appeals affirmed findings; Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer to address the legal question.
The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s sentence, addressing whether using elements of the offenses as aggravators can be improper and clarifying Pedraza-style readings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
May elements of an offense serve as aggravating circumstances?	Gomillia argues the court relied on offense elements to aggravate the sentence.	State contends such use is permissible under Pedraza and subsequent jurisprudence.	Not per se improper; depends on circumstances and record support.
Did the trial court rely on extrarecord information in sentencing Gomillia?	Gomillia contends the court considered material outside the record.	State defends inclusion of information within the record and proper aggravation analysis.	No reversible error; the record supported aggravating reasoning within discretion.
Did Pedraza v. State prohibit using elements as aggravators in all circumstances?	Gomillia argues Pedraza prevents use of offense elements as aggravators generally.	State relies on Pedraza to permit such use in appropriate contexts.	Pedraza does not universally prohibit it; circumstances may justify such use while requiring a proper record and rationale.

Townsend v. State, 498 N.E.2d 1198 (Ind. 1986) (elemental cannot be used as aggravator absent unique circumstances)
Pedraza v. State, 887 N.E.2d 77 (Ind. 2008) (limits on double enhancement; allows considering aggravators with elements in some contexts)
Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482 (Ind. 2007) (sentencing discretion and required articulation of reasons for aggravators/mitigators)
Kimbrough v. State, 979 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. 2012) (recognizes advisory sentence as starting point; discusses aggravating factors)