Joshua Eugene Plaster v. State
14-15-00522-CR
| Tex. App. | Nov 22, 2016Background
- Appellant Joshua Eugene Plaster was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon and, after pleading true to an enhancement allegation, was sentenced to 15 years’ confinement.
- At trial, the State’s theory was that appellant acted as a party to the offense (lookout) while his brother Anthony committed the robbery; eyewitness Sarah Stevenson identified Anthony as the robber and heard him say, “Watch my back, Steven.”
- Margaret Davis (who lived with appellant and Anthony) testified Anthony admitted he and appellant robbed the store; Davis also overheard appellant ask Anthony, “Why did you tell her?”
- The State played a video of appellant’s interview in which he admitted being with Anthony and Davis after the robbery, and admitted on a jail phone call that Anthony had “encouraged” him.
- Appellant challenged (1) sufficiency of the evidence to prove party liability, (2) admission of Anthony’s out‑of‑court statement to Davis, and (3) a jury charge omission failing to apply the law of parties in the application paragraph.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Plaster) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence that appellant was a party | Evidence showed appellant acted as lookout, was with Anthony before/during/after, and made inculpatory remarks — supports party liability | State failed to prove appellant participated or intended to aid; should be acquittal | Affirmed: evidence sufficient for conviction under law of parties (appellant could be the lookout) |
| Admission of co‑defendant’s statement to Davis (hearsay) | Anthony’s admission that he and appellant robbed the store was a statement against penal interest with corroboration (Stevenson’s ID, other statements) | Admission was improper hearsay violating appellant’s confrontation/ hearsay rights | Affirmed: trial court did not abuse discretion — statement admissible as statement against penal interest with corroborating circumstances |
| Jury charge omission of party‑liability application language | The abstract law of parties was given, State argued party theory; jury could consult abstract language and was not misled | Omission in application paragraph failed to instruct jury how to apply party law; reversible error | Error existed but was not egregiously harmful under Almanza; conviction stands |
| Judgment reformation | N/A | Judgment incorrectly listed enhancement as “N/A” | Judgment reformed to reflect appellant pled true and enhancement allegation is true; affirmed as reformed |
Key Cases Cited
- Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (standard for appellate review of legal sufficiency)
- Villani v. State, 116 S.W.3d 297 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003) (jury's role as sole fact‑finder and credibility determinations)
- Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (view evidence in light most favorable to verdict)
- Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (appellate court may not reweigh evidence)
- Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (duty to ensure evidence supports conviction)
- Cumpian v. State, 812 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991) (lookout behavior can support party liability)
- Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (statement against penal interest may inculpate declarant and third parties)
- Walter v. State, 267 S.W.3d 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (two‑part test for admissibility of statements against penal interest)
- Davis v. State, 872 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (proponent bears burden to show admissibility of such statements)
- Cunningham v. State, 877 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (trial court’s discretion in assessing corroboration and admissibility)
- Trevino v. State, 218 S.W.3d 234 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007) (distinguishing statements that merely shift blame from statements against penal interest)
- Vasquez v. State, 389 S.W.3d 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (importance of applying law of parties correctly in jury charge)
- Plata v. State, 926 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (jury charge requirements), overruled on other grounds by Malik v. State
- Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (procedural context cited)
- Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (egregious‑harm standard for unobjected‑to jury charge error)
- Taylor v. State, 332 S.W.3d 483 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (difficulty of proving egregious harm)