Joshua Emery v. Talladega College
688 F. App'x 727
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Emery, a Talladega College freshman, was involved in escalating encounters with local individuals on campus that culminated in a dorm‑porch brawl and, shortly thereafter, Emery being shot from across the street; the shooter was not identified.
- Campus police broke up the fight; students were escorted inside Crawford Hall and after about five minutes were permitted to return to the porch where Emery was later shot.
- Emery sued Talladega College and administrators under Alabama negligence law, alleging failure to protect students from foreseeable criminal activity and relying in part on the Clery Act.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment; the district court granted summary judgment for defendants and denied Emery’s spoliation/sanctions motions as moot. Emery appealed.
- The Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether: (1) the Clery Act creates a private duty; (2) Alabama law imposed a duty via “special circumstances” or a “special relationship”; and (3) Collins created a general duty to protect against criminal acts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the Clery Act create a private negligence duty | Clery establishes a duty to warn/protect enforceable via negligence (negligence per se) | Clery disclaims private causes of action and does not establish a standard of care | No — Clery does not create a private cause of action or a standard of care |
| Were there "special circumstances" making the shooting foreseeable | Prior campus crime and the day’s altercations made the shooting foreseeable and probable | Sporadic prior crimes and the facts of the altercations did not make this particular shooting foreseeable | No — plaintiff failed to show the particular criminal conduct was foreseeable, specialized knowledge existed, or a probability of the shooting |
| Did a "special relationship" arise after students were told to go inside then allowed back out | Allowing students back to the porch after ordering them inside created dependence and a duty to protect | Students were not incapacitated or wholly dependent; return to porch was voluntary | No — no special relationship; student was not uniquely dependent on the college for protection |
| Does Collins impose a general duty to protect campus from criminal acts | Collins supports a broad landlord/owner duty to keep premises safe (apply to college security failures) | Collins is limited to structural/fire‑safety duties and does not create a new broad duty to prevent third‑party crimes | No — Collins does not create a general duty to protect against third‑party criminal acts beyond existing Alabama doctrine |
Key Cases Cited
- Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir.) (summary judgment reviewed de novo; view facts for nonmoving party)
- New Addition Club, Inc. v. Vaughn, 903 So.2d 68 (Ala. 2004) (sets three‑part test for foreseeability/special circumstances for third‑party crimes)
- Baptist Mem'l Hosp. v. Gosa, 686 So.2d 1147 (Ala. 1996) (absent special circumstances or relationship, no duty to protect from third‑party crimes)
- Carroll v. Shoney's, Inc., 775 So.2d 753 (Ala. 2000) (prior threats/assaults did not render later murder foreseeable)
- Ex parte S. Baldwin Reg'l Med. Ctr., 785 So.2d 368 (Ala. 2000) (focus on foreseeability of the particular criminal act)
- Thetford v. City of Clanton, 605 So.2d 835 (Ala. 1992) (actual, specific notice of danger can create duty; innkeeper context)
- Collins v. Scenic Homes, Inc., 38 So.3d 28 (Ala. 2009) (distinguishes duties to guard against fire risk from general third‑party crime liability)
- State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Owen, 729 So.2d 834 (Ala. 1999) (existence of duty is a question of law for the court)