Joshua Daniel Bishop v. Warden, GDCP
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 16429
| 11th Cir. | 2013Background
- Bishop convicted in 1996 of malice murder and armed robbery and sentenced to death.
- Morrison was beaten to death; Braxley helped dispose of Morrison’s body and burn the Jeep.
- Bishop confessed to the Morrison killing and admitted involvement in Willis murder; Willis was buried near Braxley’s trailer.
- Mitigation presented for Bishop: severe childhood, expert on IED/bipolar disorder, and extensive family testimony.
- Prosecution presented evidence of Willis murder and threats; penalty phase emphasized Braxley’s culpability and Bishop’s role.
- State habeas proceedings and federal AEDPA review reviewed Strickland and Brady claims; court affirmed denial of relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial counsel were ineffective in the penalty phase for not calling officers' opinions | Bishop argues officers would show remorse and lower culpability would aid him | State contends officers' opinions were off the record and testifying would risk harm and not alter outcome | No relief; denial was reasonable under AEDPA; testimony would not undermine the record or the aggravator. |
| Whether counsel failed to introduce Braxley‑related negative evidence to mitigate | Additional evidence would show Braxley’s violence and history | Evidence was largely cumulative and not likely to alter outcome | No relief; prejudice not shown; evidence largely cumulative and not dispositive of Bishop’s own guilt. |
| Whether failure to obtain a blood spatter expert for mitigation was ineffective | Blood spatter expert would implicate Braxley in the beating | Counsel used funds for other mitigation; no prejudice shown | No relief; trial strategy and overall evidence offset any possible prejudice; not unreasonable. |
| Whether Brady/Giglio disclosure issues were procedurally defaulted and not overcome by cause | State suppressed Braxley plea offer timing, causing default to be overcome | District Attorney did not offer a plea before trial; credibility determinations rely on state court | Procedural default upheld; no cause proven to overcome default; no federal relief. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishes two-prong test for ineffective assistance and deference under AEDPA)
- Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011) (AEDPA deference for state-court determinations of Strickland)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (unreasonable application of federal law requires more than error)
- Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (cause and prejudice approach to procedural default)
- Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004) (excuses for Brady/giglio default include suppression of evidence)
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (credibility determinations on witness testimony defer to state court)
- Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144 (2010) (AEDPA review of factual determinations and deference)
- Richter v. Lockyer, 131 S. Ct. 777 (2011) (clarifies unreasonable application standard)
- Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (standard for ineffective assistance claims)
- Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855 (2010) (deference to state courts under AEDPA)
