986 F.3d 1035
7th Cir.2021Background
- Joshua Cheli, a non-certified computer systems administrative assistant, was fired by Taylorville CUSD #3 after a student allegation; he denied the allegation and received minimal pretermination process.
- The Board passed a retroactive resolution memorializing the termination and sent a certified-mail notice citing "incompetence;" Cheli requested but was not given the superintendent's written report explaining the discharge.
- Employment was governed by a Master Agreement (collective bargaining agreement) containing Article VII: §8.1 (employees "may be ... discharged for reasonable cause" and enumerated grounds), §8.2–8.4 (conference, representative, written explanation), and §8.5 (120‑day probationary at‑will period).
- The District’s Policy Manual stated default at‑will employment but preserved exceptions where employment is "otherwise specifically provided."
- Cheli sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming a procedural due process violation; the district court dismissed for failure to allege a protected property interest. The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Master Agreement creates a constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment | Cheli: §8.1’s "discharged for reasonable cause" is mandatory, creating a for‑cause entitlement | District: the "may be discharged" language is permissive; no limitation on termination | Held: §8.1 is mandatory; the Agreement limits discharge to "reasonable cause," creating a protected property interest |
| Whether §8.5 probationary clause negates the for‑cause protection after probation | Cheli: §8.5 only makes initial 120 days at‑will; employees beyond probation gain for‑cause protection | District: overall at‑will policy means no lasting protection | Held: §8.5 confirms that probationary employees are at‑will but implies nonprobationary employees are not; it supports a vested property interest after 120 days |
| Whether procedural provisions (§8.2–8.4) or the Manual’s at‑will language defeat a for‑cause expectation | Cheli: grievance/notice/representation provisions and absence of an unambiguous disclaimer reinforce the for‑cause expectation | District: procedural language is surplus if employment is at‑will; Manual’s at‑will statement functions as a disclaimer | Held: §§8.2–8.4 strengthen the for‑cause reading; the Manual’s "unless otherwise specifically provided" preserves exceptions and does not negate the Agreement’s protections |
Key Cases Cited
- Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (property interest requires entitlement that cannot be removed except for cause)
- Roman v. U.S. Postal Serv., 821 F.2d 382 (CBA language requiring "just cause" can create a property interest)
- McCammon v. Ind. Dep’t of Fin. Insts., 973 F.2d 1348 (similar "may be removed ... for cause" language created a protectible interest)
- Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314 (Ill. 1987) (at‑will presumption can be overcome by contract)
- Border v. City of Crystal Lake, 75 F.3d 270 (7th Cir. 1996) (employee handbook too permissive to create for‑cause employment)
- Lashbrook v. Oerkfitz, 65 F.3d 1339 (7th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing express contract terms from permissive manual language)
- Cromwell v. City of Momence, 713 F.3d 361 (7th Cir. 2013) (probationary provisions require supporting language to infer tenure for nonprobationary employees)
- Griggsville‑Perry Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. Ill. Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 984 N.E.2d 440 (Ill. 2013) (procedural provisions in a CBA can support an implicit for‑cause expectation)