Josh and Kelli Savering, Chattanya Chavda, Pannaben Nancha, Phillip and Lisa Klotz, Paul Arseneau, Allison Blackstein, and Jack A. Muhlbeier v. City of Mansfield
505 S.W.3d 33
| Tex. App. | 2016Background
- In 1995 the developer recorded a Plat and a Declaration of Covenants (the Declaration) for The Arbors of Creekwood; the Plat designated certain R2 lots as "intended for public recreation use." The Declaration defined "Common Properties" and stated the HOA "will hold record fee simple title to the ... Common Properties."
- The developer executed a warranty deed (Dec. 22, 1995) conveying the R2 lots to the Communities Foundation of Texas; that land later passed to Mansfield Park Facilities Development Corporation (the Park Corporation).
- Residents and the HOA maintained the R2 lots for years; in 2013 the City built a bridge over Walnut Creek connecting a public park trail to the R2 jogging trail, greatly increasing public pedestrian access.
- Adjoining homeowners (Appellants) sued the City seeking a temporary injunction, quiet title, and trespass relief, arguing the Declaration had dedicated the R2 lots to the HOA before the developer’s deed and thus the City’s bridge and access are trespass.
- The trial court denied the amended application for a temporary injunction; the court of appeals (en banc) reversed, concluding the Declaration conveyed the Common Properties (including the R2 lots) to the HOA, Appellants showed a probable right to relief on trespass, and they showed probable, irreparable injury pending trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Declaration conveyed the R2 lots (Common Properties) to the HOA | Declaration’s language (section 5.01, Article I(k)(ii), and other provisions) effectuated a present dedication of Common Properties, including R2, to the HOA | "Will hold" and "have been or will be" show future intent; Plat and Condition 1 designated R2 for public use and preclude conveyance; any conveyance must be by Plat or deed | Held: The Declaration unambiguously conveyed the Common Properties (including R2) to the HOA by dedication; last-antecedent and other provisions support present conveyance |
| Whether Appellants have standing to challenge the HOA Board’s interpretation and seek injunctive relief | Section 10.04 expressly permits Owners to enforce the Declaration; judicial adjudication can override HOA interpretations | Section 10.02 gives the Board binding authority to interpret the Declaration absent a court adjudication; owners lack the right to relitigate board determinations | Held: Appellants have standing; Sections 10.02 and 10.04 are reconcilable and permit owner suits seeking adjudication |
| Whether attempted conveyance to HOA was invalid because HOA did not yet exist (grantee-existence rule) | HOA incorporation events were contemporaneous with the Declaration filing; practical realities support recognizing the conveyance | A deed/transfer is void if the grantee did not exist when instrument was executed | Held: The grantee-existence rule, as applied, does not void the Declaration’s conveyance here given contemporaneous formation steps and factual context |
| Whether Appellants showed probable, imminent, irreparable injury warranting a temporary injunction | Increased public access after bridge opening destroyed residents’ privacy and enjoyment; injunction is proper for trespass invading possession | Damages would be adequate; requested relief includes mandatory elements (barricade) requiring extreme hardship to justify | Held: Appellants demonstrated probable, irreparable injury and sought primarily prohibitive relief; temporary injunction should have issued — trial court abused discretion in denying it |
Key Cases Cited
- Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2002) (elements required for temporary injunction)
- Oil Field Haulers Ass’n v. R.R. Comm’n, 381 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1964) (probable right of recovery standard for temporary injunctions)
- J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. 2003) (contract interpretation—read instrument as whole; no single clause controls)
- Gates v. Asher, 280 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. 1955) (property description sufficiency test under statute of frauds)
- AIC Mgmt. v. Crews, 246 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. 2008) (property description may identify land by reference)
- Parham Family Ltd. P’ship v. Morgan, 434 S.W.3d 774 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014) (doctrine that deed is void if grantee did not exist when executed)
- R & P Enters. v. LaGuarta, Gomel & Kirk, Inc., 596 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. 1980) (when instrument remains susceptible to more than one meaning, extrinsic evidence admissible)