Joseph Wood, III v. Charles Ryan
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13998
| 9th Cir. | 2014Background
- Joseph Wood was convicted in Arizona of two counts of first-degree murder (1989) and sentenced to death; Arizona Supreme Court affirmed; U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.
- Wood pursued multiple state PCR petitions and federal habeas; district court denied habeas relief in 2007; Ninth Circuit affirmed in 2012; certiorari denied in 2013.
- A warrant of execution issued for July 23, 2014. Days before the execution Wood filed a Rule 60(b) motion, a stay request, and a Rule 59(e) motion seeking relief based on Martinez v. Ryan and alleged ineffective assistance by post-conviction/sentencing counsel.
- The district court denied the Rule 60(b) and stay motions; denied the Rule 59(e) motion; granted COA on those denials. Wood appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed denial of Rule 60(b) and 59(e) for abuse of discretion and affirmed: it held Martinez did not justify relief and that attempts to develop new evidence on previously adjudicated claims amounted to an unauthorized second or successive habeas petition.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 60(b)(6) relief is warranted based on Martinez (ineffective PCR counsel) | Martinez constitutes an extraordinary circumstance that excuses procedural default and warrants reopening to reach three claims | Martinez does not supply extraordinary circumstances here and Wood cannot satisfy Martinez's requirements | Denied — court did not abuse discretion; Martinez did not justify reopening under Rule 60(b)(6) |
| Whether denial of evidentiary development as to sentencing-counsel ineffectiveness is a valid basis for Rule 60(b) relief | Denial of evidentiary development undermines integrity of prior proceedings and merits reopening | The request for new evidence attacks the merits and thus constitutes an unauthorized second or successive habeas petition | Denied — seeking to develop new evidence on an adjudicated claim is a successive habeas attempt; district court lacked jurisdiction to consider it |
| Whether Rule 59(e) relief is appropriate to alter the Rule 60(b) judgment | Court should reconsider and treat the ineffectiveness claim as not successive | No new evidence, clear error, or intervening law warrants relief; motion is merely reconsideration | Denied — 59(e) is an extraordinary remedy and standards not met |
| Whether a stay of execution should issue | Execution should be stayed to allow merits review of the claims | State's interest and procedural posture defeat stay; no significant possibility of success on the merits | Denied — equitable stay requirements unmet; timing and public interest weigh against stay |
Key Cases Cited
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (U.S. 2005) (distinguishes Rule 60(b) attacks on procedure vs. merits and bars merits-based second/successive habeas via Rule 60(b))
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2012) (establishes limited exception allowing cause to excuse procedural default where PCR counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial-counsel IAC)
- Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (U.S. 1950) (describes "extraordinary circumstances" standard for Rule 60(b))
- Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (U.S. 2007) (district courts lack jurisdiction to entertain unauthorized second or successive habeas petitions)
- Cooper v. Calderon, 274 F.3d 1270 (9th Cir. 2001) (AEDPA bars district courts from considering successive habeas petitions absent court of appeals authorization)
- Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (U.S. 2006) (stay of execution is equitable; requires significant possibility of success on the merits)
- Lopez v. Ryan, 678 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (burden on petitioner to show Martinez both applies and is meritorious)
- Post v. Bradshaw, 422 F.3d 419 (6th Cir. 2005) (Rule 60(b) attempts to introduce newly discovered evidence on adjudicated claims treated as successive habeas)