Joseph Stancle v. Ivan Clay, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 18207

Stancle pleaded nolo contendere to two counts in California Superior Court on January 10, 2007, receiving multi-year sentences to be served concurrently, with no appeal filed and final judgment March 11, 2007.
Stancle filed a first habeas petition in the superior court on October 12, 2007; the petition was denied November 13, 2007.
A second, related petition was filed in the same superior court on December 27, 2007 and denied January 24, 2008.
Stancle then pursued further state post-conviction relief, including petitions in the California Court of Appeal (denied February 14, 2008) and the California Supreme Court (denied October 16, 2008).
On February 24, 2009, Stancle filed a federal habeas petition; the district court concluded it was time-barred under AEDPA § 2244(d).
The magistrate judge held no statutory gap tolling between the first and second superior court petitions, and no equitable tolling for mental impairment; the district court adopted this.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether statutory gap tolling applies between the first and second state petitions	Stancle contends the 44-day gap tolls under King v. Roe.	Clay argues the second petition added new claims and was not limited to elaboration, so no tolling.	No gap tolling; second petition not limited to elaboration.
Whether statutory tolling applies between the first and third petitions	Stancle argues ongoing tolling across rounds.	Clay argues delays were unreasonable and not justified.	No tolling; delays between rounds deemed unreasonable.
Whether the first petition was decided on the merits for tolling purposes	If first petition was denied for procedural reasons, gap tolling could apply.	Court treated the first petition as merits-based denial; tolling disallowed.	First petition denied on merits; no tolling due to procedural grounds.
Whether equitable tolling based on mental incompetence is warranted	Stancle asserts illiteracy and cognitive deficits prevented timely filing; seeks Bills v. Clark tolling.	Petitioner delayed filing despite assistance; no extraordinary impediment established.	No equitable tolling; mental impairment did not prevent timely filing given available assistance.

King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2003) (two-part King test for tolling between petitions in the same court)
Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010) (applies King framework to tolling between petitions)
West v. Ryan, 652 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2011) (defines what constitutes a claim for tolling analysis)
Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2007) (second petition must elaborate on first petition's claims)
Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2003) (overlapping petitions in same round; tolling limitations)
Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (U.S. 2006) (denial on merits does not control timeliness automatically)
Gaston v. Palmer (Gaston II), 447 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006) (limits gap tolling when delays are unreasonable)
Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2003) (tolling framework for state petitions and intervals)
Velasquez v. Kirkland, 639 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2011) (unreasonable delays in tolling analysis)
Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2003) (interval tolling mechanics between rounds)