Joseph Shelton v. John Marshall, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13826

In 1981 Shelton, Thomas, and Silva abducted Kevin Thorpe and Laura Craig; Thorpe was shot to death and Craig was later killed. Shelton was convicted of first-degree murder (Thorpe), second-degree murder (Craig), kidnapping, theft, and weapons offenses.
Norman Thomas, a key prosecution witness, provided the only direct testimony that Shelton premeditated and deliberated Thorpe’s killing; Shelton’s own statements and other evidence did not directly establish mens rea for first-degree murder.
Prior to trial Thomas’s counsel arranged with the prosecutor (DA DePasquale) that Thomas would not be psychiatrically examined before testifying and murder charges against Thomas would be dropped; that agreement was not disclosed to Shelton or the jury.
The suppressed portion of the deal concerned Thomas’s competency and the prosecution’s efforts to prevent a pre-testimony psychiatric evaluation; this information would have been powerful impeachment material.
After Silva’s related litigation revealed the deal, Shelton brought a Brady claim in state court and federal habeas; the district court denied relief, and Shelton appealed under AEDPA.
The Ninth Circuit held the prosecution’s nondisclosure violated Brady and granted habeas relief as to Shelton’s first-degree murder conviction for Thorpe, ordering retrial or resentencing; it affirmed the other convictions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Shelton)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether prosecution suppressed favorable impeachment evidence in violation of Brady	Prosecution hid a deal preventing Thomas’s psychiatric exam, which impeached his competence and credibility	The deal was not favorable/material or cumulative to impeachment presented at trial	Yes; suppression violated Brady
Whether the suppressed evidence was material (prejudice) under Brady/AEDPA	The jury relied on Thomas as the only direct evidence of premeditation; knowing the deal would create a reasonable probability of different verdict on first-degree murder	Shelton’s admissions and other evidence corroborated Thomas; suppression not outcome-determinative	Material as to Thorpe first-degree murder; reasonable probability of different result; relief granted as to that count
Whether relief should extend to other convictions (Craig murder, kidnapping, theft, weapons)	Concealment undermines overall confidence, potentially affecting other counts	Strong independent evidence supports other convictions; any error not prejudicial to those counts	Not material to other counts; convictions affirmed
Standard of review under AEDPA for state-court denial	De novo review of materiality because state court addressed only favorability	State court decision was last reasoned decision but did not address materiality; AEDPA deference limited	Court reviewed materiality de novo and applied Brady precedent to grant relief for Thorpe conviction

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose evidence favorable to accused)
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) (Brady three-part test: favorable, suppressed, material)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (impeachment evidence falls within Brady)
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (nondisclosure of agreements affecting witness credibility violates due process)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (materiality standard: reasonable probability of different result undermining confidence)
Silva v. Brown, 416 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2005) (Brady error based on same undisclosed deal with Thomas; prejudicial to Thorpe conviction)
Horton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2005) (tainted witness testimony as the centerpiece of prosecution’s case)
Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2005) (suppressed impeachment material found prejudicial where witness testimony was central)