Joseph S. Chirillo, Jr., M.D. v. Robert Granicz, etc.
199 So. 3d 246
| Fla. | 2016Background
- Decedent (Jacqueline) was an outpatient with a history of depression treated by Dr. Chirillo; medication switched from Effexor to Lexapro after she reported side effects and stopping Effexor.
- The day after prescription change, Jacqueline died by suicide; no note and family reported no clear warning of imminent suicide.
- Plaintiff (Robert Granicz, personal representative) sued for medical malpractice, alleging Dr. Chirillo breached the standard of care, causing the suicide.
- Trial court granted summary judgment for defendants, finding no legal duty to prevent an outpatient’s unforeseeable suicide.
- Second District reversed, holding the physician owed a statutory professional duty of care (per § 766.102) and that proximate cause/foreseeability of suicide were jury questions; it certified conflict with Lawlor.
- Florida Supreme Court approved the Second District, disapproved Lawlor, and remanded for trial, holding duty arises from the statutory standard of care while foreseeability of the suicide is a proximate-cause factual issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a physician owes a legal duty to an outpatient to prevent suicide or only a duty to provide treatment consistent with the medical standard of care | Granicz: duty is to exercise reasonable care in diagnosis/treatment per medical standard; breach can cause suicide | Petitioners: no duty to prevent suicide of a non-custodial outpatient; suicide foreseeability is part of duty analysis | Court: Duty derives from statutory/professional standard of care (not a distinct custodial suicide-prevention duty); foreseeability of the suicide is a proximate-cause factual question for the jury |
| Proper legal framework for analyzing duty vs. proximate cause | Granicz: duty should be framed as statutory standard of care; foreseeability of specific injury is proximate cause | Petitioners: under McCain, foreseeability of suicide is part of duty and no duty exists for outpatients | Court: McCain’s ‘‘zone of risk’’ duty analysis applies, but where a statutory duty exists (§ 766.102), duty is the standard of care; foreseeability of the specific suicide is for proximate cause |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate on foreseeability/proximate cause grounds | Granicz: expert evidence raised genuine issue that stopping Effexor contributed to suicide, precluding summary judgment | Petitioners: evidence showed suicide was unforeseeable and summary judgment proper | Court: Genuine factual disputes about causation/foreseeability exist (expert testimony), so summary judgment was improper |
| Whether Lawlor was correctly decided and controls here | Granicz: Lawlor misapplied duty analysis by treating foreseeability of suicide as dispositive duty question | Petitioners: Lawlor correctly denied duty in outpatient suicide context | Court: Disapproved Lawlor as erroneously treating suicide foreseeability as a duty issue and for applying a nonapplicable custodial-duty framework |
Key Cases Cited
- McCain v. Florida Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 1992) (duty vs. proximate cause framework; foreseeability and ‘‘zone of risk’’ analysis)
- Lawlor v. Orlando, 795 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (held no duty for outpatient suicide; disapproved by this Court)
- Granicz v. Chirillo, 147 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (district court decision approving statutory standard-of-care duty; certified conflict)
- Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1995) (expert testimony governs medical malpractice standard of care)
- Sweet v. Sheehan, 932 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (describes standard for professional medical care)
- Brooks v. Serrano, 209 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968) (expert testimony ordinarily required to establish medical standard and breach)