Joseph Richardson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), 49A04-1609-CR-2196

In early 2012, 12-year-old J.W. was taken to defendant Joseph Richardson’s garage where he first digitally penetrated her and then had penile intercourse with her. J.W. later told a cousin, who informed J.W.’s mother; police were notified and interviewed Richardson.
Richardson (then 18) initially told police he thought J.W. might have been 12 or 13; at trial he testified he believed she was 14.
J.W.’s mother testified she had repeatedly warned Richardson to stay away from J.W. because J.W. was only 12.
The State charged Richardson with two counts of child molesting: one Class B felony (sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct with a child under 14) and one Class C felony (fondling/touching a child under 14).
At a bench trial Richardson was convicted on both counts; he appealed arguing (1) insufficient evidence because he reasonably believed J.W. was at least 14, and (2) the convictions violate the continuing crime doctrine because the acts were part of a single continuous transaction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency / reasonable‑belief defense	State: evidence (mother’s warnings, Richardson’s equivocal statements to police) disproves reasonable belief he thought victim was ≥14	Richardson: his trial testimony shows he reasonably believed J.W. was 14, which is a defense	Held: Richardson failed to prove reasonable belief by preponderance; evidence sufficient to convict
Continuing crime doctrine (double charging)	State: digital penetration and subsequent intercourse are separate offenses at separate times	Richardson: the two sexual acts were continuous and thus constitute a single transaction, so both convictions impermissible	Held: Acts were distinct and separated by time/acts (removed pants, then intercourse); doctrine does not bar two convictions

Smart v. State, 40 N.E.3d 963 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (standard for sufficiency review; appellate court will not reweigh evidence)
Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 2007) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard articulated for sufficiency review)
Garcia v. State, 936 N.E.2d 361 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (reasonable‑belief defense to child molesting when defendant reasonably believed victim was ≥14)
T.M. v. State, 804 N.E.2d 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (discussing reasonable‑belief defense burden and scope)
Weaver v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1066 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (defense that excuses culpability admits elements but excuses liability; defendant bears preponderance burden)
Firestone v. State, 838 N.E.2d 468 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (continuing crime doctrine requires compressed acts in time/purpose; separate sexual acts at different times can support separate convictions)
Chavez v. State, 988 N.E.2d 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (acts occurring "while" another act was committed may be a single transaction; separate encounters can be distinct crimes)
Koch v. State, 952 N.E.2d 359 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (describes continuing crime doctrine as preventing double charging for a single continuous offense)
Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (continuing crime doctrine as part of Indiana double jeopardy analysis)