5 F.4th 775
7th Cir.2021Background
- Joseph Kuberski purchased a new 2013 Fleetwood Storm RV and reported more than 40 defects to the dealer.
- Camping World (REV’s authorized dealer) attempted repairs seven times over two years without success.
- REV offered factory repairs at its Decatur, IN facility, offered to pay transport costs, and scheduled repairs for August 18, 2015.
- Kuberski refused to tender the RV for factory repairs, instead suing REV under North Carolina breach-of-warranty law and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act; the district court instructed the jury that Kuberski must "comply with the terms of the warranty," and the jury returned a verdict for REV.
- On appeal Kuberski argued the jury should have been instructed that "substantial compliance" with the warranty suffices under North Carolina law; the Seventh Circuit assumed arguendo that substantial compliance could apply but held any instructional error was harmless because Kuberski intentionally denied REV the opportunity to inspect and repair the vehicle.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether North Carolina's substantial-compliance doctrine can apply to a breach-of-warranty claim | Kuberski: substantial compliance should excuse literal tendering; minor deviations shouldn't forfeit remedies | REV: warranty required notice and actual tender/delivery; literal compliance is required to give manufacturer opportunity to cure | Court assumed substantial compliance could apply in some contexts but did not decide the issue definitively; proceeded to harmless-error analysis |
| Whether the district court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on substantial compliance | Kuberski: refusal imposed too high a burden and was reversible error | REV: instruction requiring compliance was proper under the warranty terms | Court acknowledged potential legal error in not giving the instruction but treated the error as non-prejudicial |
| Whether any instructional error prejudiced Kuberski such that a new trial is required | Kuberski: error likely confused jury and affected outcome because he substantially complied in practice | REV: error was harmless because Kuberski intentionally refused to tender the RV, depriving REV of any opportunity to cure | Held: No prejudice—Kuberski’s intentional refusal to deliver the vehicle defeated a substantial-compliance defense; judgment affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Riley v. Carpenter, 55 S.E. 628 (N.C. 1906) (substantial-compliance elements: omissions must be inadvertent, not willful)
- Lyerly v. Malpass, 346 S.E.2d 254 (N.C. App. 1986) (substantial compliance may fail where the remaining omission frustrates the contract's purpose)
- Boyd v. Illinois State Police, 384 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2004) (harmless-error analysis for incorrect jury instructions)
- Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 365 (7th Cir. 2000) (new trial requires showing jury instruction both misstated law and caused prejudice)
- Voelker v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc., 353 F.3d 516 (7th Cir. 2003) (state law governs warranty claims under the Magnuson-Moss Act)
- Lewis v. City of Chicago Police Dept., 590 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 2009) (prejudice required for new trial even when instruction is incorrect)