Joseph K. Hoskins and Daniel McLayea v. State of Indiana
2017 Ind. App. LEXIS 380
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Both appeals consolidated: Hoskins and McLayea moved for discharge under Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C) after trial dates were set beyond one year from charging. Courts denied; appeals followed.
- Hoskins charged June 17, 2015; trial ultimately set for September 26, 2016 (467 days later). 72 days were conceded chargeable to Hoskins; State-requested continuances produced 175 days disputed by the State.
- McLayea charged June 29, 2015; final trial date set November 14, 2016 (504 days). 131 days conceded chargeable to McLayea; remaining delay (including last-minute State continuances to analyze seized cell phones) was 373 days.
- In both cases the State delayed forensic review of cell phones seized at arrest and sought continuances near trial after discovering potentially probative evidence. Defendants objected and sought discharge under Rule 4(C).
- The trial court denied both discharge motions; the Court of Appeals reviewed de novo the application of Rule 4(C) to undisputed facts and for clear error as to factual findings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Rule 4(C) one-year clock began at filing or when defendants retained counsel | State: clock tolled until counsel retained | Defendants: clock starts at filing/arrest | Clock began at filing; did not toll for retention of counsel |
| Whether delays caused by State-requested continuances (including phone forensics) are chargeable to defendants | State: some delays derive from defendants' acts (requests about phones) | Defendants: State’s belated forensic work caused delay and is chargeable to State | State’s late forensic strategy is chargeable to State; delays not charged to defendants |
| Whether defendants waived Rule 4(C) objections by failing to object earlier or by not proposing alternative dates | State: defendants failed to object or propose dates; thus charged with delay | Defendants: objections were timely or not required; burden to State to secure trial within Rule 4(C) | Defendants did not waive Rule 4(C) rights; burden remained on State to pick a date within one year |
| Whether continuances should be measured from motion date or prior trial date for charging delay | State: measure from date defendant filed motion for continuance | Defendants: measure by trial-to-trial intervals as usual | Court followed trial-to-trial measurement (declined State’s proposed alternative) |
Key Cases Cited
- Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. 2013) (standard of review for Crim. R. 4(C) motions)
- Andrews v. State, 441 N.E.2d 194 (Ind. 1982) (late counsel changes can justify tolling)
- Little v. State, 415 N.E.2d 44 (Ind. 1981) (counsel retention delays may be charged to defendant)
- State ex rel. Sheppard v. Circuit Court of Clark County, 413 N.E.2d 258 (Ind. 1980) (similar treatment of counsel-related delay)
- Eguia v. State, 468 N.E.2d 559 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (delay charged where defendant failed to obtain counsel timely)
- Cook v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1064 (Ind. 2004) (delays caused by defendant chargeable under Rule 4(C))
- Leek v. State, 878 N.E.2d 276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (defendant not required to remind court of State’s duty under Rule 4(C))
- Mefford v. State, 51 N.E.3d 327 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (discussion of measuring continuance delay intervals)
- Todisco v. State, 965 N.E.2d 753 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (measuring defendant-caused delay from trial date to trial date)
Result: Reversed and remanded for both appellants — trial dates set beyond one year contained delays chargeable to the State, so discharge under Rule 4(C) was warranted.