Joseph Harper v. Chris Perkins, 459 F. App'x 822

Appellants are Perkins, Courson, Courson, and Gourley of the Coffee County Sheriff’s Department, and Davis, all Defendants, appealing an interlocutory denial of immunity defenses.
Harper was paralyzed after Defendants tasered him while he stood in a tree during an attempted arrest.
The district court denied qualified immunity on Harper’s federal §1983 claim and denied official immunity on Harper’s state-law claims.
The complaint alleges Harper, unarmed and with hands raised, was tased from below while four officers surrounded him in a tree.
The court applied the Fourth Amendment excessive-force analysis and held the “obvious clarity” standard supported liability at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
The appeal follows, with Defendants arguing (i) the force was reasonable, (ii) rights were not clearly established, (iii) some Defendants did not personally participate, and (iv) official immunity shields state-law claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether qualified immunity shields individual officers from Harper’s §1983 claim.	Harper, on the complaint’s facts, shows excessive force; rights clearly established.	Officers acted within discretion; no clearly established right violated.	No qualified immunity at this stage.
Whether Defendants’ failure to personally discharge the taser shields them from liability.	All Defendants concurred in use and interfered; liability may attach for joint action.	Personal participation required for §1983 liability.	Not shielded; all defendants accountable at this stage.
Whether Defendants are protected by official immunity on Harper’s state-law claims.	Allegations show actual malice and injurious intent.	Official immunity should bar suit absent actual malice.	Official immunity not dispositive; allegations suffice to survive.

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (Supreme Court 1989) (establishes objective-reasonableness standard for excessive force)
Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2002) (three-part test for clearly established right)
Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir. 2002) (other factors; reasonable officer perspective on scene)
Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2004) (reasonableness and split-second judgments in use of force)
Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898 (11th Cir. 2009) (“obvious clarity” standard for clearly unlawful conduct)
Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919 (11th Cir. 2000) (duty to intervene to stop excessive force)
Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2004) (single taser use may be permissible under totality of circumstances)