Joseph E. McClain III v. Dell, Inc., Seaton Corp. D/B/A Staff Management, 07-15-00141-CV

Background

Pro se relator Joseph E. McClain sued Dell, Seaton Corp., and individual defendants alleging they filed repeated fraudulent claims (including a purportedly fraudulent motion under Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a) and sought attorney’s fees and other relief for conversion/identity-theft–related harms.
Defendants moved for sanctions and to declare McClain a vexatious litigant; McClain contends their filings relied on defective or unsworn affidavits and improper evidence.
At a February 3, 2015 hearing the trial court dismissed McClain’s suit under Rule 91a for “lack of evidence,” found him a vexatious litigant, and awarded attorney’s fees to defendants (per McClain’s account).
McClain filed motions to vacate under Texas Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code ch. 27 and Rule 91a; he alleges subsequent trial judges refused to hear his motions (claiming lack of jurisdiction or lost plenary power).
McClain sought relief from the appellate courts (7th Court of Appeals and others) asserting the trial court abused discretion, violated Rules of Evidence and Texas procedural rules (91a), and that defendants engaged in fraud and improper use of character evidence.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Validity of dismissal under Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a (lack of evidence)	McClain: dismissal was improper because defendants’ motion/amendments relied on defective or unsworn affidavits and the court refused to consider his judicial‑notice motion or allow evidence.	Defendants: moved to dismiss under 91a; argued lack of evidentiary support for the asserted causes of action and sought fees.	Appellate record indicates relator contends trial court erred; appellate courts issued orders but did not grant relief — McClain alleges courts refused to hear/vacate the dismissal.
Use of character evidence and admissibility of defendants’ testimony	McClain: testimony and statements were inadmissible character evidence (T.R.E. 404) and some submissions were not proper affidavits.	Defendants: relied on their filings and testimony to support sanctions and vexatious‑litigant finding.	McClain asserts the trial court improperly considered inadmissible evidence; record does not show reversal — issue unresolved in relator’s brief.
Vexatious litigant finding	McClain: defendants misrepresented prior proceedings and failed to meet statutory criteria for finding a pro se litigant vexatious.	Defendants: argued McClain’s litigation history warranted vexatious‑litigant designation.	McClain contends the trial court abused discretion in designating him vexatious; appellate relief was not obtained per his filings.
Jurisdiction to hear motions to vacate / plenary power	McClain: trial court/other judges improperly refused to hear his Rule 91a/Ch. 27 motions and wrongly asserted lack of jurisdiction or lost plenary power.	Defendants: maintained motions were untimely or otherwise not grounds to disturb the dismissal.	McClain alleges the trial courts and the 7th COA declined to consider his motions; no successful relief shown in the brief.

Key Cases Cited

Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) (mandamus requires record showing clear abuse of discretion and lack of adequate remedy at law)
In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. 2009) (standards for original proceedings and mandamus review)
Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182 (U.S. 1924) (definition and scope of “defraud” in conspiracy context)
Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (U.S. 1987) (scope of conspiracy statutes impairing governmental functions)
Carr v. Hertz Corp., 737 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. App. — Corpus Christi 1987) (procedural authority cited by relator)