Joseph E. Corcoran v. Ron Neal, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 6063

In 1997 Joseph Corcoran shot and killed four men in his Fort Wayne home; a jury convicted him of four counts of murder and recommended death; the trial judge imposed death.
At sentencing the judge found the statutory aggravator of multiple murders (high weight), found four mitigators (one medium, three low), rejected six others, and made remarks referencing the heinousness of the crime and Corcoran’s future dangerousness.
On direct appeal the Indiana Supreme Court remanded, expressing concern that the judge’s remarks suggested reliance on nonstatutory aggravators (future dangerousness, heinousness, victims’ innocence) and ordered resentencing with a new statement.
On remand the trial judge reimposed death, explicitly stating she relied only on the statutory aggravator (multiple murders) and that her earlier remarks were explanatory/contextual and to support her personal conclusion.
The Indiana Supreme Court accepted the judge’s explanation and affirmed; Corcoran pursued federal habeas relief raising two remaining claims: (1) the judge impermissibly relied on nonstatutory aggravators; and (2) the judge failed/refused to consider proffered mitigating evidence.
The district court denied habeas; the Seventh Circuit (this opinion) affirms, applying AEDPA deference to the state court’s factual findings and concluding the state court’s rulings were not unreasonable.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial judge relied on nonstatutory aggravating factors (e.g., future dangerousness, heinousness) in imposing death	Corcoran: the judge’s sentencing remarks show she relied on nonstatutory aggravators, invalidating the death sentence	State: on remand the judge explicitly stated she relied only on statutory aggravators and used earlier remarks as permissible context/personal conclusion	Court: Affirmed state-court factual finding that judge relied only on statutory aggravator; AEDPA deference makes the state decision not unreasonable
Whether the judge refused to consider proffered mitigating evidence (age and jail behavior) in violation of Eddings	Corcoran: the judge summarily rejected age (22) and jail behavior, effectively refusing to consider them as mitigation	State: the judge admitted and considered the evidence, then permissibly gave it little or no weight based on record	Court: Held no Eddings violation; judge considered the evidence and reasonably declined to find them mitigating

Corcoran v. Wilson, 651 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2011) (prior Seventh Circuit treatment of Corcoran litigation)
Corcoran v. State, 774 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 2002) (state supreme court decision upholding resentencing and mitigation analysis)
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (sentencer may not refuse to consider relevant mitigating evidence)
White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697 (2014) (explaining AEDPA’s deferential unreasonableness standard)
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988) (statutory aggravators channel sentencer’s discretion)
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (sentencer must be able to consider any mitigating factor)