Joseph De Ritis v. Thomas McGarrigle, 861 F.3d 444

Background

De Ritis, an Assistant Public Defender in Delaware County, was transferred from a trial team to juvenile/preliminary units in 2012; he believed the transfers were punitive for "taking too many cases to trial."
Over ~11 months De Ritis repeatedly told judges, other attorneys, and county officials (the County Solicitor and County Council chair) that he was being punished for seeking trials and that this implicated clients' rights.
His statements included in-court "idle chatter" with judges/attorneys and out-of-court meetings with county officials; he relied on hearsay from colleagues and did not investigate the rumor for months.
Public Defender Roger learned of the circulating allegation, confronted De Ritis, and fired him after De Ritis admitted making the statements.
De Ritis sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging First Amendment retaliation; the district court denied qualified immunity to Roger and this interlocutory appeal followed.
The Third Circuit reversed, holding De Ritis’s speech was not protected for multiple reasons and that Roger was entitled to qualified immunity.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether De Ritis spoke as a citizen or as an employee (Garcetti test)	De Ritis: statements were citizen speech, not part of official duties	Roger: in-court statements were part of job duties (rapport/mode of representation) and thus unprotected	Court: in-court remarks were employee speech (no First Amendment protection)
Whether out-of-court statements addressed a matter of public concern	De Ritis: told county officials his demotion raised constitutional/client-rights issues (public concern)	Roger: most statements were private grievance/gossip and not matters of public concern	Court: statements to other attorneys were private grievance; statements to county officials touched public concern but were recklessly unverified
Pickering balancing — employer’s interest vs. employee’s interest	De Ritis: public interest in exposing alleged misconduct/rights violations outweighs employer interest	Roger: rumors impugned office integrity, threatened working relationships, and risked disruption in a small office	Court: employer’s efficiency and disruption interests outweighed De Ritis’s interest — speech not protected
Qualified immunity — was any First Amendment right clearly established?	De Ritis: right to report official misconduct is established	Roger: even if some speech implicated public concern, the circumstances (employee speech, reckless rumors, likely disruption) precluded a clearly established constitutional violation	Court: no constitutional violation on these facts; alternatively, right not clearly established in a factually similar context — qualified immunity granted

Key Cases Cited

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (public employee speech pursuant to official duties is not protected)
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (balancing public employee speech interests against employer efficiency)
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (public concern v. private grievance analysis)
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (actual malice standard; distinguishes public employment context)
Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (public employee speech framework; relevance of job duties)
Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 1 v. City of Camden, 842 F.3d 231 (3d Cir.) (speech that arises only from employment duties is not citizen speech)
Munroe v. Central Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454 (3d Cir.) (application of Pickering and public concern inquiry)
Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 772 F.3d 979 (3d Cir.) (whistleblowing/public interest considerations)
Swineford v. Snyder Cty., 15 F.3d 1258 (3d Cir.) (reckless falsity and impact on balancing)