Joseph Boulton v. Christopher Swanson, 795 F.3d 526

Background

Joseph Boulton, a Genesee County sheriff’s sergeant and union leader, testified at a mandatory contract arbitration that Undersheriff Swanson had misrepresented the level of Taser, firearm, and CPR training provided by the Sheriff’s Office.
Shortly after the arbitration, Boulton was investigated, suspended for several days without pay, and demoted from sergeant; the Notice of Disciplinary Action cited creating a hostile work environment and derogatory/sexist comments to detainees and referenced Section 4.10 (a rule prohibiting criticism of the Sheriff’s Office).
Boulton claims the disciplinary actions were retaliation for his protected speech under the First Amendment and that the County is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the discipline invoked the official criticism policy (§ 4.10).
The County defends by asserting Boulton’s statements were not protected (made in his official role/union arbitration), that the discipline would have occurred regardless of the speech, and that municipal liability is not shown.
The district court struck a late Third Amended Complaint adding the Sheriff as a defendant, granted summary judgment to the County on the First Amendment claim, and dismissed individual defendants; Boulton appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Boulton’s arbitration testimony was speech protected by the First Amendment	Boulton argues his arbitration statements were citizen speech on matters of public concern (training, detainee safety) and made in his capacity as a union member, not pursuant to job duties	County contends the speech either concerns internal personnel matters or was made pursuant to Boulton’s employment duties and thus unprotected under Garcetti	Court held Boulton’s arbitration statements were protected: they were made as a citizen (union activity) and addressed matters of public concern (training, safety) under Pickering/Connick and Lane.
Whether the County’s criticism policy (§ 4.10) rendered the discipline a municipal constitutional violation (Monell)	Boulton contends discipline invoked § 4.10 and thus the County executed an unconstitutional policy in retaliation for protected speech	County argues even if speech was protected, discipline was based on other misconduct and precedent permits such criticism rules unless misapplied	Court held Boulton failed to show the County’s policy was the actual cause of the discipline; no Monell liability because the County showed the discipline was supported by nondiscriminatory grounds.
Whether discipline would have occurred absent protected speech (causation / same-decision defense)	Boulton argues other officers with misconduct were not disciplined and that discipline stemmed from retaliatory ‘‘witch hunt’’ triggered by his speech	County argues Boulton’s misconduct (harassment of detainees, lying, interfering with investigation) was substantially more serious than comparators and would have led to discipline regardless of speech	Court held comparator evidence insufficient and the ‘‘witch hunt’’ theory cannot tie the County policy to the adverse action; a reasonable juror could not find the County liable.
Whether district court abused discretion in denying leave to file a very late Third Amended Complaint adding the Sheriff	Boulton says discovery later revealed additional Sheriff involvement warranting amendment	County and district court say Boulton knew enough earlier and the amendment would unduly expand defendants and claims late in the case	Court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.

Key Cases Cited

Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (balancing employee speech on matters of public concern against employer interests)
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (speech pursuant to official duties is not protected)
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (test for whether speech addresses a matter of public concern: content, form, context)
Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014) (limits Garcetti to speech ordinarily within an employee’s duties; public-employee, union, or court testimony may be protected)
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under § 1983 requires an official policy, custom, or ratification causing the constitutional violation)
Brown v. City of Trenton, 867 F.2d 318 (6th Cir. 1989) (upholding a police criticism rule absent a showing it was misapplied to protected speech)