Joseph Aruanno v. Sarah Davis
679 F. App'x 213
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- Joseph Aruanno, civilly committed as a sexually violent predator after a New Jersey conviction, filed numerous federal civil actions and appeals (over 39 actions and 45 appeals in district and circuit courts).
- The District Court issued an order to show cause why Aruanno should not be denied in forma pauperis (IFP) status for abusive litigation and referenced PLRA “three strikes” concerns, though Aruanno is not a "prisoner" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h).
- The District Court concluded Aruanno had abused the IFP privilege, rejected his assertions of imminent danger as too vague, denied his request for a guardian, and administratively terminated three actions unless the $400 filing fee was paid within 30 days.
- Aruanno appealed from the denial of IFP in three consolidated appeals; the Third Circuit reviewed the denial for abuse of discretion.
- The District Court limited its measure to denying IFP for these civil filings (not imposing a prospective IFP injunction) and preserved Aruanno’s ability to proceed IFP in habeas matters.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a non-prisoner civilly committed individual may be denied IFP for abusive filing | Aruanno argued previous relief failures forced repeated filings; denying IFP would unfairly restrict access and he alleged imminent danger and need for a guardian | District Court argued Aruanno repeatedly abused the privilege by filing numerous meritless actions and appeals; court may exercise discretion to restrict IFP in extreme circumstances | Denial of IFP was within the court’s discretion due to abusive filings; no abuse of discretion found |
| Whether Aruanno’s allegations met the PLRA “imminent danger” exception | Aruanno claimed imminent danger from fights/victimization and lack of legal access | Court found allegations vague, speculative, and insufficient to meet imminent danger standard | Imminent danger exception rejected as conclusory and unsupported |
| Whether PLRA §1915(g) applies given Aruanno is not a "prisoner" | Aruanno contended he should not be treated like a prisoner; sought relief from filing restrictions | Court noted §1915(h) excludes civilly committed persons from the PLRA prisoner definition, but discretion remains to deny IFP where abuse occurs | PLRA statutory "three strikes" rule does not apply, but analogous discretionary restrictions were permissible and narrowly applied |
| Whether the procedural protections for filing injunctions were observed | Aruanno argued denial was improper without further protections or guardian appointment | District Court issued show-cause order, considered Aruanno’s response, and denied guardian request | Procedural safeguards satisfied: exigent circumstances, opportunity to show cause, narrowly tailored relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (statutory purpose: ensure indigent access while allowing dismissal of frivolous IFP suits)
- Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080 (3d Cir. 1995) (IFP aims to remove fee barriers but recognizes abuse concerns)
- Gibbs v. Ryan, 160 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 1998) (general practice: grant IFP based on indigence absent extreme circumstances)
- Sinwell v. Shapp, 536 F.2d 15 (3d Cir. 1976) (review standard for IFP denial)
- Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1993) (requirements before imposing filing injunctions)
- Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307 (3d Cir. 2001) (upholding §1915(g) as denying the privilege to file without fees, not blocking access)
- Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448 (3d Cir. 2013) (vague, conclusory claims do not satisfy imminent danger standard)
- Butler v. Department of Justice, 492 F.3d 440 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (criteria for filing injunctions and assessing abusive litigation)
- Lockhart v. D’Urso, 408 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1969) (recognizing extreme circumstances may justify denying IFP)