Joseph A. Buffey v. David Ballard, Warden, 782 S.E.2d 204

Background

In Nov. 2001 an elderly victim was sexually assaulted and robbed; police collected a rape kit and submitted samples for DNA testing.
Petitioner Joseph Buffey was arrested in Dec. 2001 for unrelated break‑ins, questioned, and ultimately offered a time‑limited plea; he pled guilty in May 2002 to two counts of sexual assault and one count of robbery and received aggregate sentences of 70–110 years.
The State Police lab completed DNA testing by April 5, 2002 that tentatively excluded Buffey as the donor of seminal fluid, but this report was not disclosed to defense counsel before the plea was accepted.
Buffey filed habeas petitions asserting Brady suppression, ineffective assistance, and other claims; initial habeas relief was denied in 2004 when earlier DNA interpretation was inconclusive.
New, more advanced DNA testing (post‑conviction) definitively excluded Buffey and identified another man (Adam Bowers) as the primary contributor; Buffey’s second habeas petition again raised suppression of exculpatory DNA evidence.
The West Virginia Supreme Court held that the State’s failure to disclose material exculpatory DNA evidence prior to the plea violated Brady, reversed the circuit court, and remanded to allow withdrawal of the guilty plea.

Issues

Issue	Buffey’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
Does Brady’s disclosure duty apply at the plea‑bargaining stage?	Brady requires disclosure of material exculpatory evidence before a guilty plea; plea decisions depend on appraisal of the prosecution’s case.	Brady is a trial right focused on preserving fair verdicts; Ruiz limits pre‑plea disclosure (at least for impeachment).	Yes — WV Supreme Court holds Brady extends to plea negotiations and a defendant may seek to withdraw a plea based on suppressed material exculpatory evidence.
Did the State suppress favorable DNA evidence?	Lab results (finalized April 5, 2002) excluded Buffey and were known to lab personnel and imputed to prosecutors but were not disclosed before the plea.	State contends results were inconclusive or prosecutorial team was unaware until later; no intentional suppression.	Suppression established: DNA was favorable, in possession of State actors (lab), and not disclosed to defense prior to plea.
Was the suppressed DNA material (i.e., prejudicial to voluntariness of the plea)?	Defense counsel testified he would have advised against pleading if he had known; reasonable probability the outcome would differ.	State argued Buffey would have pled anyway and DNA didn’t exclude presence/complicity (e.g., condom theory).	Materiality found: reasonable probability the plea decision would have been different; suppression prejudiced Buffey’s due process rights.
Is Buffey’s claim barred by res judicata given earlier habeas proceedings?	New, definitive DNA testing and evidence of earlier prosecutorial awareness are newly discovered evidence permitting a successive petition.	State asserted res judicata because claims were previously raised.	Not barred: new DNA results and additional proof of pre‑plea knowledge place the claim within exceptions to res judicata.

Key Cases Cited

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (suppression of material exculpatory evidence violates due process)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (materiality standard: reasonable probability the outcome would differ)
Ruiz v. United States, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (pre‑plea disclosure of impeachment material not constitutionally required; distinguishes impeachment from exculpatory evidence)
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) (Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel extends to pre‑plea stage)
Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448 (9th Cir. 1995) (exculpatory evidence can be critical to voluntariness of a plea)
State v. Youngblood, 221 W. Va. 20 (2007) (three‑part Brady framework applied in West Virginia)