Jose George, Matilde George, and Elaine George v. Compass Bank, 04-15-00676-CV

Background

Jose George sued his son Alberto for misappropriation of funds; Alberto later filed third-party claims against Compass Bank and Citibank asserting certain transfers to Jose were unauthorized.
Compass Bank froze accounts belonging to Jose, his wife Matilde, and daughter Elaine, sought to interplead those funds, and sought attorney’s fees; the trial court initially denied interpleader.
Multiple nonsuits and a partial summary judgment resulted in severance of Compass Bank’s claims against Alberto; Compass later obtained a take-nothing summary judgment against Alberto and attorneys’ fees.
On July 30, 2015 the trial court allowed Compass Bank to interplead the account funds (less the attorneys’ fees amount) and discharged Compass Bank; the court also signed a severance order that left the new cause number blank.
The Georges filed a motion to modify/correct the July 30 orders and later a notice of appeal using the original case number rather than the (blank/changed) severed number; Compass moved to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction based on the case-number discrepancy.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether filing a motion to modify and notice of appeal using the original (pre-severance) case number defeats appellate jurisdiction	The Georges contend Blankenship and similar authorities treat misnumbering as a technicality; their filings were a bona fide attempt to invoke appellate jurisdiction and there was no confusion about which judgment was appealed	Compass argues the appeal should be dismissed because the post-severance judgment was assigned a new cause number and filings under the wrong number do not invoke jurisdiction	Court should follow Blankenship/Matlock — substance over form; misnumbering does not defeat jurisdiction when no confusion exists (plaintiff wins on jurisdictional point)
Whether the severance order was proper or rendered the original numbering erroneous	Georges argue severance was unnecessary or erroneous because the summary judgment and interpleader disposed of all claims and parties, so the original number remained correct for post-judgment filings	Compass treats the severance and reassignment of cause number as controlling, making filings under the old number ineffective	Court treats severance as potentially erroneous here; using original number is defensible where severance serves no purpose
Whether Compass properly interpleaded funds and obtained attorney’s fees against the account holders	Georges contend all funds belonged to account owners and no other party claimed them, so interpleader and fee award were improper or redundant	Compass justifies interpleader and fee recovery tied to its litigation and earlier fee award against Alberto	Court’s orders allowed interpleader and awarded fees; Georges challenge those merits in the appeal (jurisdictional dispute may proceed)
Whether procedural precedents like K.A.F. or Philbrook bar the Georges’ procedural approach	Georges distinguish K.A.F. (different context: accelerated appeals) and argue Philbrook has been questioned; they rely on later cases favoring substance-over-form	Compass relies on technical precedents to argue strict numbering rules should apply	The opinion favors later precedents (Blankenship, Matlock) endorsing substance over numbering; K.A.F. and Philbrook are distinguishable or questioned

Key Cases Cited

Blankenship v. Robins, 878 S.W.2d 138 (Tex. 1994) (severance misnumbering is a technicality; filings can be bona fide attempts to invoke appellate jurisdiction)
Matlock v. McCormick, 948 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997) (misnumbered motion for new trial may still extend appellate deadlines when only one judgment is implicated)
Philbrook v. Berry, 683 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. 1985) (earlier precedent on severance and plenary power; later questioned)
Texas Instruments Inc. v. Tetron Energy Mgmt., 877 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. 1994) (criticizes Philbrook and emphasizes substance over procedural technicalities)
In re K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d 923 (Tex. 2005) (distinguishes accelerated-appeal rules; motion for new trial is not a substitute for a notice of appeal)