Jose Eduardo Arredondo v. State, 406 S.W.3d 300

Defendant Jose Eduardo Arredondo (juvenile at time of offenses; 18 at judgment) was convicted by jury of capital murder, aggravated kidnapping, and two counts of aggravated sexual assault arising from the sexual assault and murder of a 2-year-old child.
Trial court sentenced life on each count: the two aggravated sexual-assault life terms to run consecutively; the other life terms concurrent.
Pretrial, Arredondo moved to suppress the autopsy report, medical examiner testimony, and DNA results, arguing the county medical examiner had not filed the constitutional oath of office and thus her acts were void.
Arredondo also argued two consecutive life sentences on the sexual-assault counts effectively imposed life-without-parole for nonhomicide offenses in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments (Graham/Miller principles) and legislative intent.
The trial court denied suppression; the court of appeals affirmed on both issues.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the county medical examiner is a “public officer” required to file the Art. XVI, §1 oath before performing autopsy	Examiner is an appointed officer; appointment makes her an "appointed officer" who must take and file the constitutional oath; failure voids her acts and evidence	Examiner performs non-sovereign, supervised functions and is removable/controlled by commissioners court; thus a public employee not required to file the oath	Examiner is not a public officer under Art. XVI, §1; suppression denial was correct
Whether two consecutive life sentences for juvenile on nonhomicide counts violate Eighth/14th Amendments or legislative intent (life v. life-without-parole)	Consecutive life terms amount to de facto life-without-parole for nonhomicide offenses, prohibited by Graham/Miller and contrary to Penal Code amendment	Miller and Graham do not prohibit discretionary life-without-parole when the juvenile also was convicted of homicide; statutory text permitting life for transferred juveniles does not bar discretionary LWOP on nonhomicide counts tied to homicide	Assuming arguendo the sentence is de facto LWOP, Graham/Miller and the Penal Code amendment do not bar a discretionary LWOP-like result where the juvenile was convicted of homicide and nonhomicide offenses; appellant’s constitutional and statutory challenges fail

Prieto Bail Bonds v. State, 994 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999) (analyzing whether function-based sovereign powers make a position a public officer)
State ex rel. Hill v. Pirtle, 887 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (distinguishing public officer from public employee; focus on independent sovereign functions)
French v. State, 572 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (acts of judge who had not taken oath held void)
Schoenbacher v. Harris County, 594 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1979) (chief juvenile probation officer held a public employee due to board supervision and control)
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (U.S. 2010) (Eighth Amendment forbids LWOP for juvenile offenders for nonhomicide offenses)
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (U.S. 2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles unconstitutional; sentencer must consider youth and its attendant characteristics)