Jose Diaz-Flores v. Merrick Garland, 993 F.3d 766

Jose Diaz-Flores, a Mexican national who entered the U.S. without inspection as a child, had two Oregon convictions for first‑degree burglary (ORS § 164.225).
DHS placed him in removal proceedings charging (1) illegal entry and (2) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT); he conceded illegal entry and contested the CIMT charge.
The immigration judge sustained the CIMT charge, held him ineligible for cancellation of removal, and denied asylum/withholding/CAT relief; the BIA affirmed in a published decision.
On review, the Ninth Circuit framed the legal question as whether ORS § 164.225 (first‑degree burglary of a dwelling) is a CIMT, applying the categorical and modified‑categorical approaches.
The court found ORS § 164.225 divisible between dwelling‑and non‑dwelling offenses, identified Diaz‑Flores’s conviction as burglary of a dwelling, and held that burglary of a regularly or intermittently occupied dwelling is a CIMT.
The court denied Diaz‑Flores’s vagueness challenge to the term “crime involving moral turpitude,” finding controlling precedent precluded relief.

Issue	Diaz‑Flores's Argument	Garland/DHS's Argument	Held
Whether ORS § 164.225 (1st‑deg burglary) constitutes a "crime involving moral turpitude"	The statute is overbroad and burglary generally is not a CIMT; his conviction should not render him removable as a CIMT	Burglary of a regularly or intermittently occupied dwelling intrudes on privacy/security of the home and is a CIMT	The statute is divisible; his conviction was burglary of a dwelling, which is a CIMT; petition denied
Whether the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" is unconstitutionally vague	The term is vague and cannot fairly put a person on notice	Precedent upholds the phrase; the BIA's interpretation is reasonable	Vagueness challenge rejected as foreclosed by binding precedent (Jordan and Ninth Circuit decisions)

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (establishing the categorical approach)
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (defining the modified‑categorical approach)
Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (rejecting vagueness challenge to "crime involving moral turpitude")
Cuevas‑Gaspar v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir.) (burglary not categorically a CIMT when intent could be to commit any crime)
Syed v. Barr, 969 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir.) (definition: CIMT is "vile, base, or depraved")
United States v. Cisneros, 826 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir.) (divisibility analysis in related context)
Hernandez‑Cruz v. Holder, 651 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir.) (distinguishing residential from nonresidential burglary for CIMT analysis)
James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (recognizing heightened risk and condemnation when burglary risks confrontation in a dwelling)