Jose Alanniz v. William Barr, 924 F.3d 1061

Background

Alanniz, a Mexican national, entered the U.S. without inspection in 1986, was paroled in 1997 for adjustment purposes, and adjusted to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status on August 3, 2000.
He has criminal convictions for controlled-substance offenses (2002; later amended) and a 2006 conviction for being under the influence of cocaine; removal proceedings were initiated in 2012 based on the drug convictions.
Cancellation of removal requires seven years of continuous residence after an "admission in any status" under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2); DHS and the IJ/BIA treated the 1997 parole as not constituting an "admission."
The IJ pretermitted (denied) Alanniz’s cancellation application as time-barred, denied asylum (finding fear generalized criminal violence), and denied CAT relief; the BIA affirmed on cancellation and asylum grounds and found Alanniz did not challenge CAT denial on appeal.
Alanniz petitioned for review in the Ninth Circuit; the court affirmed pretermission of cancellation (parole is not an admission), declined relief on record-sufficiency and exhaustion grounds, but remanded the asylum claim for additional factfinding on the proposed particular social group.

Issues

Issue	Alanniz's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether 1997 parole qualifies as an "admission in any status" for §1229b(a)(2) (start of 7-year accrual)	1997 parole constituted an admission, so continuous residence began in 1997 and he accrued 7 years before the 2006 conviction	Parole under §1182(d)(5) is not an "admission;" statutory definition of admission requires lawful entry after inspection; BIA precedent rejects treating parole/FUP as admission	1997 parole is not an admission; continuous residence began with 2000 LPR adjustment; cancellation pretermitted (denied)
Whether lack of the 1997 parole document in the administrative record required remand	Record incomplete; document critical to determining type of parole and admission status	Alanniz forfeited objection by not raising it below; burden to prove eligibility is on applicant; absence not prejudicial and would not change outcome under precedent	No remand; objection forfeited and meritless; absence of document not prejudicial
Whether Alanniz exhausted challenge to IJ's denial of CAT relief before BIA	Argued CAT in BIA brief; exhaustion requirement is flexible—he need not use precise terminology	BIA entitled to treat issues as those actually argued in its brief; Alanniz did not present a developed CAT argument or evidence of past torture	BIA correctly concluded Alanniz did not challenge CAT denial; exhaustion failure and no evident basis for CAT relief
Whether proposed particular social group (long-term U.S. residents deported to Mexico who face kidnapping/extortion) was properly adjudicated	Proposed group is narrower (long-term U.S. residents deported to Mexico) and merits case-specific factfinding	IJ mischaracterized group; cognizability involves factual inquiry; agency should assess evidence	Court remanded asylum claim to agency for initial factfinding on the group’s viability; agency, not the court, must decide

Key Cases Cited

Garcia v. Holder, 659 F.3d 1261 (9th Cir.) (parole as SIJ treatment held to constitute admission in narrow contexts)
Garcia-Quintero v. Holder, 455 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir.) (Family Unity Program acceptance previously treated as admission)
Medina-Nunez v. Lynch, 788 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir.) (accepting BIA’s Reza-Murillo interpretation and applying Chevron deference to deny FUP/asylum admission expansion)
Altamirano v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 586 (9th Cir.) (parole under §1182(d)(5) not an admission)
INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002) (courts should remand to agency for matters statutorily placed in agency hands)
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (Chevron/Brand X deference principles)
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (approach to statutory categorization of controlled-substance offenses)