Jorge Baez-Sanchez v. William Barr, 947 F.3d 1033

Jorge Baez-Sanchez, a Mexican national, is removable and inadmissible based on a conviction for aggravated battery of a police officer under 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).
He applied for a U visa and sought an inadmissibility waiver under 8 U.S.C. §1182(d)(3)(A)(ii); an immigration judge (IJ) granted the waiver twice and reaffirmed it after a BIA remand.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) argued the IJ lacked authority to grant such waivers, relying on Matter of Khan to assert that only the Attorney General/Secretary could act.
The Seventh Circuit previously ruled that 8 C.F.R. §1003.10(a) permits IJs to exercise the Attorney General’s powers unless another regulation reserves them (Baez-Sanchez v. Sessions), and remanded for the BIA to address whether waiver authority had been transferred or limited to applicants abroad.
On remand the BIA refused to follow the Seventh Circuit’s mandate, failed to address the court’s specified questions, and reiterated the Secretary-only view; the Seventh Circuit held this refusal unlawful, concluded the Attorney General retains waiver power and IJs may exercise it, vacated the BIA decision, and left the IJ’s waiver in force.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether immigration judges may grant §1182(d)(3)(A)(ii) waivers	IJs may exercise the AG’s waiver authority under 8 C.F.R. §1003.10(a)	Only the Attorney General/Secretary may grant waivers; IJs lack authority (Matter of Khan)	IJs may exercise the AG’s waiver power; §1003.10(a) unambiguous and not displaced
Whether waiver authority was transferred to the Secretary	No statute, regulation, or reorganization plan transferred the AG’s waiver power	Authority over U visas and waivers belongs exclusively to the Secretary	Court found no lawful transfer; for this proceeding AG retains the authority
Whether waiver relief is limited to applicants outside the U.S.	In‑country applicants can seek waivers adjudicated by IJs	Waiver authority limited to applicants abroad	Court treated the question as settled for this case and allowed IJ adjudication of in‑country applicant
Whether another remand was required after the BIA’s noncompliance	Court should enforce its mandate and not remand again given BIA’s defiance	DOJ/BIA asked for remand for an authoritative decision	Court refused further remand due to agency obduracy; vacated BIA decision and left IJ ruling in force

Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (judicial decisions are conclusive and not subject to executive disapproval)
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) (courts may not supply agency reasons on review; agencies must explain their decisions)
United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984) (non‑mutual offensive issue preclusion does not bind the United States)
United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165 (1984) (courts’ mandates must be followed by lower tribunals and agencies)
National Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (agencies may reinterpret ambiguous statutes/regulations within limits)
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (limits and framework for deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous rules)
Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009) (remand principles after identifying agency error)
Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006) (discussing remand and agency opportunity to decide issues)
INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002) (remand doctrine when agency decisions are flawed)
Baez‑Sanchez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 854 (7th Cir. 2017) (prior Seventh Circuit holding that IJs may exercise AG’s powers under §1003.10(a))
L.D.G. v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1022 (7th Cir. 2014) (supporting precedent on IJ authority)
Meridor v. Attorney General, 891 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2018) (following the Seventh Circuit’s view on IJ authority)