143 So. 3d 335
Fla.2014Background
- Jordan was convicted of burglary with an assault or battery (1st degree) and strong-arm robbery (2nd degree) and sentenced as an HVFO to concurrent life with 15-year minimums.
- A Rule 3.800(a) motion alleged the robbery life sentence was impermissible; the trial court vacated the robbery sentence to 30 years with a 10-year minimum, still concurrent.
- No resentencing hearing was held; the trial court reasoned no presence was required since the life sentence on the other count remained unchanged.
- The Third District held Jordan was not constitutionally entitled to be present at resentencing, treating the act as ministerial, and certified a question about the continued validity of Frizzell after abolition of parole.
- The Florida Supreme Court reframed the certified question to whether presence is required when a post-conviction court reduces one count but leaves a longer concurrent sentence intact.
- The Court answered affirmatively that presence is required, but held the error was harmless due to Jordan’s concurrent true-life sentence on another count.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether presence is required at re-sentencing when one count’s sentence is reduced but a longer concurrent sentence remains | Jordan argues presence is required for a proper resentencing process. | The district argued the resentencing was ministerial and did not require presence. | Presence required; error harmless due to concurrent life sentence. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (concurrent sentence doctrine and absence considerations cited)
- Frizzell v. State, 238 So.2d 67 (Fla. 1970) (abrogated concurrent sentence doctrine in habeas corpus cases)
- Acosta v. State, 46 So.3d 1179 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (presence required at rule 3.800(a) resentencing; ministerial vs discretionary acts)
- Orta v. State, 919 So.2d 602 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (resentencing not ministerial when discretion exists)
- Mullins v. State, 997 So.2d 443 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (discretionary resentencing not ministerial)
- Velez v. State, 988 So.2d 707 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (concurrent-sentence decisions not ministerial in some contexts)
- Jackson v. State, 767 So.2d 1156 (Fla. 2000) (right to be present at critical stages, including resentencing)
- Griffin v. State, 517 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1987) (presence necessary at resentencing to submit evidence)
- State v. Scott, 439 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1983) (resentencing correction requires presence)