Jordan v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, 374 P.3d 1195

Laura Jordan defaulted on a deed-of-trust–secured home loan; Nationstar (loan servicer) contracted to service the loan.
After default, Nationstar’s vendor rekeyed Jordan’s front door, posted a notice and a lockbox procedure to retrieve a key; Jordan regained entry, removed her belongings, and vacated the property.
Jordan filed a class action (≈3,600 homeowners) asserting trespass, breach of contract, and consumer-protection claims; the federal court certified two questions of Washington law to the state Supreme Court.
The deed of trust contained “entry provisions” authorizing the lender to enter, inspect, secure, and change locks after borrower default or abandonment.
Washington law follows the lien (not title) theory: RCW 7.28.230(1) forbids a mortgagee from recovering possession of real property prior to foreclosure.
The state Supreme Court majority held the entry provisions conflict with Washington law because they authorize pre-foreclosure possession; the Court also held statutory receivership (ch. 7.60 RCW) is not the exclusive pre-foreclosure access remedy.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Jordan)	Defendant's Argument (Nationstar)	Held
1. Can lender and borrower contract pre-default for lender to enter, maintain, secure property upon default?	Such predefault clauses are unenforceable because they permit the lender to take possession before foreclosure, violating RCW 7.28.230(1).	The clauses authorize only limited securing of abandoned or vacant property, not possession; practices (lockbox, notice) preserve borrower access and do not displace possession.	Held: No. The entry provisions authorize conduct (e.g., changing locks, controlling access) that amounts to possession; they conflict with lien-theory statute and are unenforceable.
2. Is Washington’s receivership scheme (ch. 7.60 RCW) the exclusive remedy for lender access prior to foreclosure?	Receivership is the statutorily prescribed means for a court to authorize third‑party control; allowing contractual access would circumvent the statute.	The receivership statutes do not expressly preclude other remedies or private contractual arrangements; receivership is discretionary and not always required.	Held: No. The receivership statutes do not constitute an exclusive remedy; the statute’s language and policy do not mandate receivership in all cases.

State v. Nw. Magnesite Co., 28 Wn.2d 1 (1947) (contract terms contrary to statute are unenforceable)
State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 102 Wn.2d 477 (1984) (limitations on freedom to contract where statute prohibits)
W. Loan & Bldg. Co. v. Mifflin, 162 Wash. 33 (1931) (mortgage lien theory: mortgagee not entitled to possession prior to foreclosure)
Howard v. Edgren, 62 Wn.2d 884 (1963) (default does not divest mortgagor’s right to possession before foreclosure)
Bain v. Metro. Mortg. Grp., Inc., 175 Wn.2d 83 (2012) (parties cannot contractually alter statutory deed-of-trust requirements)
Schroeder v. Excelsior Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 177 Wn.2d 94 (2013) (contractual waivers cannot override statutorily prescribed foreclosure procedures)
Aldrich v. Olson, 12 Wn. App. 665 (1975) (changing tenant locks is strong evidence of reassumption of possession)
Coleman v. Hoffman, 115 Wn. App. 853 (2003) (actual dominion and control is the inquiry for possession in premises-liability context)