Jordan Pribie v. State of Indiana
46 N.E.3d 1241
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Victim C.G., a high-school senior, attended a late-night party at Josh Curl’s house where defendant Jordan Pribie was present; alcohol was consumed and C.G. became ill and vomited.
- While C.G. slept on the couch, Pribie woke her, forced her into his bedroom, held her down, removed clothing, and vaginally penetrated her; he did not ejaculate and later attempted to force oral sex before stopping.
- Two housemates overheard C.G.’s protests, entered, and observed C.G. distressed; Pribie later admitted wrongdoing to them. C.G. delayed reporting and a rape kit was collected ~2.5 days later.
- The rape kit contained sperm from an unknown male but no DNA matching Pribie; the State did not introduce the unknown-DNA results at trial and an order in limine excluded evidence of the unknown male DNA under Indiana Evidence Rule 412.
- A jury convicted Pribie of Class B felony rape; he appealed, arguing erroneous exclusion of the unknown-DNA evidence and alleging juror misconduct (an ex parte bailiff-juror conversation and juror discussion about sex-offender registry consequences).
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Pribie’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 412 applies to evidence of victim’s subsequent sexual activity (unknown male DNA) | Rule 412 (as amended) bars evidence offered to prove other sexual behavior; applying new rule is procedural and not ex post facto | Evidence reflects subsequent (not prior) conduct and should be admissible; applying amended Rule 412 is ex post facto | Rule 412 applies; amendment is procedural and may be applied here (no ex post facto violation) |
| Whether the "source of physical evidence" exception to Rule 412 (412(b)(1)(A)) admits unknown-DNA results | Exception only allows rebuttal when State introduces physical evidence linking defendant (which State did not do) | DNA shows another male could be source of semen and should be admitted under exception | Exception does not apply because State did not present physical evidence tying sample to defendant |
| Whether exclusion violates defendant’s constitutional rights (412(b)(1)(C)) / right to present his account | State: defendant could fully testify and cross-examine; admitting subsequent sexual conduct is not necessary for him to present his version | Exclusion prevented Pribie from presenting his full account and effective cross-examination; Sixth Amendment implicated | Exclusion did not violate constitutional rights; defendant could present and challenge evidence about events he was involved in |
| Whether the State opened the door via testimony (C.G. or DNA expert) allowing admission of unknown-DNA | State: testimony was not inconsistent or misleading in a way that opened door; expert’s answer limited to scenario of no ejaculation | Pribie: C.G.’s statement that Curl didn’t stir and expert testimony suggested time lapse explanation; unknown-DNA would rebut inference that time explained absence of Pribie’s DNA | No opening: C.G.’s statements were consistent; expert limited answer to non-ejaculation scenario; trial court did not abuse discretion in excluding unknown-DNA; exclusion also sustainable under Rule 403 prejudice balancing |
| Whether alleged juror misconduct required relief | State: communications were either harmless or did not involve extraneous prejudicial information | Pribie: bailiff’s ex parte inquiry and juror discussions about registry may have biased jury and warrant new trial | Court held bailiff’s ex parte conversation harmless; trial court’s factual finding that jury did not hear prejudicial extraneous information stands; no abused discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798) (classic statement defining ex post facto categories)
- Hopt v. People of the Territory of Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884) (rules of evidence are procedural and generally not ex post facto when not changing statutory quantum of proof)
- Williams v. State, 681 N.E.2d 195 (Ind. 1997) (limits on admitting victim’s sexual history and defendant’s right to present his account)
- Finney v. State, 385 N.E.2d 477 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (application of rape-shield statute held procedural, not ex post facto)
- Barker v. State, 440 N.E.2d 664 (Ind. 1982) (permitting otherwise inadmissible evidence to rebut a party’s testimony in limited circumstances)
- Farris v. State, 732 N.E.2d 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (bailiff-juror communications can be harmless where no substantive influence shown)