Jordan Boyd v. Skylar Weisenberger, 2021 CA 000595

Petitioner Skylar Weisenberger filed a domestic violence order (DVO) petition alleging repeated threatening and stalking text messages by Jordan Boyd and that she was two months pregnant with his child.
The family court issued an emergency protective order and later held a hearing after service and delays; Boyd raised a jurisdictional challenge arguing the parties did not yet have a “child in common.”
At hearing the court found Skylar credible, relied on threatening texts, animal mistreatment, suicidal ideation, and access to firearms, and entered a three‑year no‑contact DVO.
The court also awarded Skylar temporary custody of the unborn child; Boyd objected that custody of an unborn child/paternity cannot be determined pre‑birth.
Boyd moved to vacate or amend; the family court denied relief. On expedited appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the DVO but reversed the temporary‑custody award and remanded for an amended DVO.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether an allegation that the parties "allegedly have a child in common" (unborn child) satisfies the DVO statutory definition of “member of an unmarried couple”	Skylar: her sworn allegation that she was pregnant with Boyd’s child satisfies the statute’s use of the term “allegedly,” so DVO jurisdiction exists	Boyd: unborn child does not create a child‑in‑common; paternity must be established at birth, so DVO jurisdiction is lacking and the matter should be an IPO	Court: Affirmed — the allegation of an unborn child satisfies KRS 403.720(5); family court had jurisdiction to issue a DVO protecting Skylar and the unborn child
Whether the family court could award temporary custody of an unborn child before birth/paternity established	Skylar: temporary custody necessary to protect the child and enable co‑parenting protections	Boyd: custody award premature because paternity and child’s birth must occur before custody determinations; UCCJEA and custody scheme presuppose a born child	Court: Reversed — awarding temporary custody pre‑birth was premature and the court lacked jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination before birth; the protective order alone protects the unborn child until post‑birth proceedings

Clark v. Parrett, 559 S.W.3d 872 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018) (defines domestic violence standard and scope of DVO/IPO framework)
Caudill v. Caudill, 318 S.W.3d 112 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010) (standard of review and construction of domestic violence statutes)
Pearce v. Univ. of Louisville, 448 S.W.3d 746 (Ky. 2014) (statutory construction principles; courts must give words their plain meaning)
Pettingill v. Pettingill, 480 S.W.3d 920 (Ky. 2015) (discussion of lethality/fatality risk factors in domestic violence evaluations)
Smith v. Doe, 627 S.W.3d 903 (Ky. 2021) (observing IPO and DVO statutes operate similarly)
Calhoun v. Wood, 516 S.W.3d 357 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017) (treats DVO and IPO statutory purposes and interpretation as closely aligned)
Baird v. Baird, 234 S.W.3d 385 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007) (preponderance standard for proving domestic violence)
Gibson v. Campbell‑Marletta, 503 S.W.3d 186 (Ky. Ct. App. 2016) (appellate review limits for family court domestic violence findings)
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 934 S.W.2d 276 (Ky. 1996) (definition of preponderance standard in analogous context)