Jones v. Wheelersburg Local School Dist.
2013 Ohio 3685
Ohio Ct. App.2013Background
- Dana Jones, a school employee, was terminated after a state auditor investigated discrepancies in latchkey program cash receipts; the auditor’s report and a hearing officer recommended termination and potential criminal charges.
- Jones sued Wheelersburg Local School District, Superintendent Mark Knapp, and Treasurer George Grice alleging emotional distress, slander/defamation, interference with contractual relations, and (later raised) malicious prosecution-related theories.
- Appellees moved for summary judgment, submitting affidavits from Knapp and Grice describing their discovery of the discrepancy, reporting to the State Auditor, and participation in the disciplinary process; appellant sought to strike portions as hearsay.
- The trial court: refused to consider certain documents as Civ.R. 56(C) evidence, concluded R.C. 2744.09(B) removed the district’s immunity but not Knapp’s/Grice’s individual immunity, granted summary judgment on intentional infliction of emotional distress and interference with contractual relations, and denied summary judgment on slander/defamation (pending); Jones later voluntarily dismissed remaining claims then appealed.
- On appeal the Fourth District reviewed de novo and affirmed: it held (1) Jones could not pursue a malicious-prosecution claim raised first in opposition to summary judgment; (2) no genuine issue existed on malicious prosecution or intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (3) interference with contract could not lie against employer/supervisory defendants acting within scope of duties.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Malicious prosecution (criminal) | Jones argued genuine issues exist about defendants’ role in initiating/procuring prosecution and lack of probable cause | Defendants argued claim not pled and, alternatively, grand jury indictment creates presumption of probable cause | Held: Jones may not raise a new malicious-prosecution theory at summary judgment; record shows indictment occurred and no evidence rebuts probable-cause presumption, so no genuine issue exists |
| Intentional infliction of emotional distress | Jones claimed defendants’ investigation, interrogation, accusations, and termination caused serious emotional/physical harm | Defendants argued their investigative and disciplinary actions were lawful, not extreme and outrageous as a matter of law | Held: Conduct did not meet the extreme-and-outrageous standard; summary judgment proper for this claim |
| Tortious interference with contract | Jones claimed defendants maliciously interfered with her employment contract | Defendants argued they were the employer/supervisors whose actions were within scope of duties and thus not liable for interference | Held: Employer/supervisory defendants cannot be liable for interference with employment contract when acting within their duties; summary judgment proper |
| Evidentiary and statutory-immunity challenges (affidavits; R.C. 2744) | Jones argued the affidavits contained hearsay and that Knapp/Grice were not immune | Defendants defended affidavits and asserted statutory immunity for individuals | Held: Court deemed these issues moot because Jones cannot prevail on the merits of her claims; appellate court declined to decide them |
Key Cases Cited
- Froehlich v. Ohio Dept. of Mental Health, 114 Ohio St.3d 286 (Ohio 2007) (sets elements for malicious prosecution)
- Trussell v. General Motors Corp., 53 Ohio St.3d 142 (Ohio 1990) (malice, lack of probable cause, favorable termination are elements of malicious prosecution)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment standard and relevance of factual disputes)
- Yeager v. Local Union 20, 6 Ohio St.3d 369 (Ohio 1983) (defines extreme and outrageous conduct for intentional infliction of emotional distress)
- Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 71 Ohio St.3d 408 (Ohio 1994) (elements required for intentional infliction of emotional distress)
- Melanowski v. Judy, 102 Ohio St. (Ohio) (probable cause assessed by defendant’s knowledge and circumstances at institution of proceedings)
- Deoma v. Shaker Heights, 68 Ohio App.3d 72 (Ohio App. 8th Dist.) (probable cause standard and grand-jury presumption discussion)