Jones v. State, 2011 WY 115

Jones pled guilty to a third battery against a household member under § 6-2-501(b) and (f)(ii).
He challenged the constitutionality of § 6-2-501(f)(ii) as unconstitutionally vague.
The district court sentenced him to four to five years, suspended to four years’ probation.
Incident occurred January 18, 2010, involving a dispute with his girlfriend and their child; evidence included hair on the car floorboard.
Appellant was originally charged with battery and obstructing a peace officer; the interference charge was dismissed after plea negotiations.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is § 6-2-501(f)(ii) void and unconstitutionally ambiguous?	Jones contends 'after' supports multiple meanings and creates ambiguity.	Wyoming courts have consistently read the statute to convey notice and the plain meaning is clear.	Not ambiguous; statute valid and constitutional.

Giles v. State, 96 P.3d 1027 (Wyo. 2004) (facial vagueness review not automatic; need substantial protected conduct or no standard of conduct)
Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (U.S. 1975) (due process requires only sufficient warning of proscribed conduct)
Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031 (Wyo. 1979) (statutory vagueness standards and warning concepts)
Petrillo, United States v., 332 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1947) (definitional clarity and notice in criminal statutes)
Crain v. State, 218 P.3d 934 (Wyo. 2009) (rule of lenity applies only when statute ambiguous)
Sena v. State, 2010 WY 93 (Wyo. 2010) (enhanced sentencing under § 6-2-501(f)(ii) applied in third-conviction cases)
Romero v. State, 233 P.3d 951 (Wyo. 2010) (interpretation of § 6-2-501(f)(ii) in successive batteries)
Dean v. State, 194 P.3d 299 (Wyo. 2008) (application of enhanced sentencing provisions)
Sarr v. State, 166 P.3d 891 (Wyo. 2007) (statutory interpretation of § 6-2-501(f)(ii))
Craig v. State, 163 P.3d 828 (Wyo. 2007) (precedential interpretation of second/third battery provisions)