Jones v. Rochester City School District
676 F. App'x 95
| 2d Cir. | 2017Background
- Howard Jones, a school employee, sued Rochester City School District alleging retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL).
- Jones alleged the District disciplined him and took adverse actions after he filed an EEOC charge; he claimed changed evaluation scores, denial of overtime, and a discipline for lateness during a blizzard.
- The District moved for summary judgment; the district court granted it and dismissed all retaliation claims, concluding the District disciplined Jones before it knew of his EEOC complaint and other asserted incidents lacked evidentiary support.
- Jones conceded in his complaint and summary judgment filings that he received the EEOC right-to-sue letter on June 29, 2011; if so, his Title VII filing was untimely (filed more than 90 days later).
- On appeal Jones argued the right-to-sue letter mail receipt should be presumed three days later (making his Title VII claim timely) and pointed to the evaluation changes, overtime denial, and blizzard discipline as retaliatory acts.
- The Second Circuit affirmed: it declined to disturb Jones’s own admission about receipt of the right-to-sue letter, and held Jones failed to show a causal connection or admissible evidence to defeat summary judgment on the merits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of Title VII claim | Jones argued the right-to-sue letter should be presumed received three days after mailing, making his claim timely | District relied on Jones’s admission he received the letter on June 29, 2011, making the Title VII claim untimely | Court declined the presumption because Jones had already asserted receipt on June 29; Title VII claim untimely |
| Whether disciplinary action was retaliatory | Jones pointed to changed evaluations, denial of overtime, and blizzard-related discipline as retaliation for EEOC filing | District argued it disciplined Jones before learning of his EEOC charge and that asserted incidents lack proof or causal link | Court affirmed summary judgment: Jones failed to show causal connection or produce admissible evidence to survive summary judgment |
| Sufficiency of evidence to survive summary judgment | Jones relied on testimony and vague assertions regarding overtime and evaluation changes | District argued assertions were conclusory, speculative, or unsupported by record evidence | Court held vague, conclusory allegations insufficient; nonmoving party must present evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for them |
| Temporal proximity as evidence of causation | Jones implied timing supported retaliation inference | District noted discipline preceded notice of EEOC complaint and other timing gaps undermined causation | Court found temporal proximity insufficient and, where discipline preceded notice, causation fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010) (standard of review for employment discrimination summary judgment)
- Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834 (2d Cir. 2013) (McDonnell Douglas framework applied to retaliation and summary judgment standard)
- Sherlock v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 84 F.3d 522 (2d Cir. 1996) (90-day filing requirement after receipt of EEOC right-to-sue letter)
- Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (temporal proximity must be very close to support inference of retaliation)
- FDIC v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 607 F.3d 288 (2d Cir. 2010) (non-moving party may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation)
- Hayut v. State Univ. of New York, 352 F.3d 733 (2d Cir. 2003) (a scintilla of evidence is insufficient; there must be evidence on which a jury reasonably could find for the non-movant)