Jones v. Parmley
714 F. App'x 42
| 2d Cir. | 2017Background
- Fifteen members of the Onondaga Nation (the "Onondaga 15") pursued §1983 claims after New York State Troopers dispersed a 1997 political protest; much of the dispersal was video-recorded. Nearly 20 years of litigation followed, including a prior Second Circuit opinion affirming denial of qualified immunity, Jones v. Parmley.
- In 2015 most plaintiffs settled; the Onondaga 15 rejected settlement and proceeded to jury trial. Their counsel were permitted to withdraw shortly before trial, so they proceeded pro se.
- The district court managed a complex jury trial involving 15 pro se plaintiffs and over 50 defendants, imposing limits on opening/closing times, screening written questions through the judge, having plaintiffs designate a single questioner, and actively questioning witnesses.
- The Onondaga 15 claimed the court’s trial-management procedures, the judge’s demeanor (and denial of recusal), certain jury instructions, and the grant of counsel withdrawal violated their rights.
- The district court denied recusal, gave the disputed jury instructions, allowed counsel withdrawal for plaintiffs refusing settlement, and conducted the trial under the management procedures described. The Second Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trial management procedures (limits on time, screening questions, single spokesperson, judge questioning witnesses) | Procedures deprived Onondaga 15 of fair trial and procedural due process | Court needed to manage unwieldy trial and exclude inadmissible evidence; procedures were reasonable | Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion in managing trial to keep it orderly and exclude inadmissible evidence |
| Judicial bias / denial of recusal | Judge’s conduct and one heated exchange with plaintiff Ross John, plus pretrial demeanor, showed bias warranting recusal | Record does not show objective facts supporting bias; heated exchanges and heckling by plaintiffs do not prove partiality | Affirmed: no abuse of discretion; record insufficient to show bias after transcript review |
| Jury instructions (personal involvement, easement boundary, First Amendment/retaliation) | Instructions misstated law or omitted requested easement facts; First Amendment instruction conflated tests | Instructions properly limited liability to personal involvement; easement facts were disputed and for jury to decide; any First Amendment error was not plain and fatal | Affirmed: personal-involvement instruction correct; denial of easement instruction proper; First Amendment incorporation of retaliation test was error but not plain error affecting substantial rights |
| Withdrawal of counsel | Withdrawal left plaintiffs without counsel and was improper where refusal to settle drove the motion | Magistrate properly found breakdown in relationship and good cause to withdraw for those who refused settlement, based on sealed and public submissions | Affirmed: magistrate did not abuse discretion granting withdrawal for plaintiffs who refused settlement under Local Rule 83.2(b) |
Key Cases Cited
- Jones v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2006) (prior Second Circuit decision on qualified immunity in the same underlying dispute)
- U.S. v. Yakobowicz, 427 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2005) (standard for reviewing trial management decisions)
- U.S. v. Filani, 74 F.3d 378 (2d Cir. 1996) (discussion of judicial neutrality/bias review and need to examine trial transcript)
- U.S. v. Arena, 180 F.3d 380 (2d Cir. 1999) (abuse-of-discretion standard for recusal denials)
- Hudson v. New York City, 271 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 2001) (standards for reviewing jury instructions and plain error doctrine)
- Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2006) (personal involvement requirement for §1983 damages)
- Curley v. Village of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2001) (First Amendment retaliation standard)
- Whiting v. Lacara, 187 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 1999) (standard of review for motions to withdraw as counsel)
