Jones v. Norman, 633 F.3d 661

Jones was arrested for armed robbery and related offenses in May 2001 and charged in July 2001.
Jones filed a Faretta motion on August 16, 2001 to represent himself at trial.
A September 5, 2001 hearing evaluated Jones's competency and whether his pro se request was knowing and voluntary.
The trial court denied the Faretta motion on September 7, 2001, citing lack of knowledge of procedural rules, limited education, impaired note-taking, and uncertain penalty ranges.
Jones renewed his pro se request in January 2003; the court denied new counsel, but never ruled on the renewed Faretta request.
Jones was convicted after a jury trial and sentenced to 30 years as a prior and persistent offender; he later petitioned for habeas corpus in federal court.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Procedural default of Faretta claim	Jones contends the claim was merits-based on direct appeal.	State waived procedural-default defense and argued merits.	Waiver of default defense; not raised by State on merits.
Was Jones's Faretta waiver knowing and voluntary?	Jones argues the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily given.	State argues waiver was not knowing and voluntary due to factors like procedure familiarity and penalties.	Missouri court erred by considering ability factors; waiver was not properly tested but ultimately the court held the denial violated Faretta's requirements

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975) (right to self-representation with knowing, voluntary waiver)
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (U.S. 1993) (competence standard for self-representation)
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (U.S. 1942) (autonomy and right to represent yourself)
Meyer v. Sargent, 854 F.2d 1110 (8th Cir. 1988) (test for knowing and voluntary waiver)
United States v. Washington, 596 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2010) (limits on considering defendant's procedural knowledge in Faretta waiver)
Shafer v. Bowersox, 329 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 2003) (AEDPA standards for habeas relief)