Jones v. Mississippi, 209 L Ed 2d 390

In 2004 Brett Jones (age 15) stabbed and killed his grandfather; he was convicted of murder and, under Mississippi law at the time, received a mandatory life-without-parole (LWOP) sentence.
On direct appeal and initial collateral review the LWOP sentence stood; after Miller v. Alabama (2012) the Mississippi Supreme Court ordered resentencing so a sentencer could consider Jones’s youth.
At resentencing the judge acknowledged Miller discretion but again imposed LWOP; Jones appealed, invoking Miller and Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016), arguing the judge was required to find the juvenile permanently incorrigible (or at least to state an implicit on-the-record finding).
The Mississippi Court of Appeals rejected Jones’s fact‑finding and explanation arguments; the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve splits about the requirements of Miller and Montgomery.
The Supreme Court held that Miller and Montgomery do not require a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility nor an on‑the‑record explanation with an implicit such finding; a discretionary sentencing system that allows consideration of youth is constitutionally sufficient.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Jones)	Defendant's Argument (Mississippi)	Held
Whether a sentencer must make a separate factual finding of "permanent incorrigibility" before imposing LWOP on a juvenile homicide offender	Miller/Montgomery require a discrete finding that the juvenile is permanently incorrigible before LWOP	Miller requires only discretion to consider youth; no formal factfinding is necessary	No. Miller/Montgomery do not require a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility.
Whether a sentencer must provide an on‑the‑record sentencing explanation that implicitly finds permanent incorrigibility	An on‑the‑record explanation (implicit finding) is necessary to ensure youth was actually considered	On‑record explanations are not mandated; discretion suffices and defense counsel usually ensures youth is raised	No. An on‑the‑record explanation or implicit finding is not constitutionally required.
Whether Jones’s resentencing complied with Miller/Montgomery and whether those precedents are disturbed	Miller/Montgomery required more than mere discretion, so resentencing without an explicit finding is deficient	Resentencing gave the judge discretion to consider youth; that satisfies Miller; Montgomery’s retroactivity remains intact	Resentencing complied with Miller and Montgomery; the Court does not overrule those cases and leaves States free to adopt stricter rules.

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juvenile homicide offenders is unconstitutional; sentencers must be able to consider youth)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (Miller applies retroactively on collateral review and clarified Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement)
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty unconstitutional for offenders under 18; youth reduces culpability)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (LWOP unconstitutional for juvenile non‑homicide offenders; incorrigibility assessment required)
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (capital sentencing requires individualized consideration of mitigating circumstances)
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (sentencer must be allowed to consider any aspect of defendant’s character or record as mitigating)
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (sentencer must consider mitigating evidence, including youth)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (retroactivity framework distinguishing substantive from procedural rules)