Jones v. Lubrizol Advanced Materials, Inc., 583 F.Supp.3d 1045

Plaintiffs sue over FlowGuard Gold CPVC plumbing (products designed/marketed by Lubrizol and sold by Charlotte Pipe and Cresline) asserting breach of express warranty (state-law claims) and, for one plaintiff, negligence/negligent failure-to-warn under Massachusetts law.
Named plaintiffs allege individual pipe failures and warranty denials; they seek to represent a nationwide class and state subclasses (Arizona, Massachusetts, Michigan, Washington) of all owners of structures with FlowGuard Gold installed since 1991.
Defendants moved to strike the class allegations under Rule 12(f) and Rule 23, arguing the proposed classes include many uninjured members who lack Article III standing.
The Court treated the motion as a pre-certification challenge under Rule 23(d)(1)(D), permitting an early legal determination where no amount of discovery could cure the defect.
The Court held that the class definitions inevitably include members who have not suffered a concrete injury (TransUnion principle: risk of future harm is insufficient for monetary-claim standing) and therefore struck the class allegations.
The Court ordered plaintiffs to amend to remove class allegations within 21 days and certified the order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Procedural vehicle to strike classes	Rule 12(f) strike is proper now	Strike should be evaluated under Rule 23	Court rejected Rule 12(f) here and evaluated under Rule 23(d)(1)(D)
Article III standing of absent class members	Class members suffered common injury (e.g., price premium or purchase they would not have made)	Many class members never experienced a failure and thus lack concrete injury	Court: proposed classes inevitably include uninjured members; risk of future harm insufficient; standing lacking for class certification
Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive/declaratory class	(Plaintiffs seek injunctive/declaratory relief applicable to class)	Rule 23(b)(2) improper because monetary relief would be non-incidental and individualized	Court: Dukes bars (b)(2) where individualized monetary relief predominates; (b)(2) inappropriate here
Certification and appellate review	Plaintiffs want chance for discovery before resolving class issue	Defendants argue legal defect cannot be cured by discovery; prompt resolution needed	Court struck class allegations, ordered amendment, and certified the issue for interlocutory appeal under §1292(b)

Pilgrim v. Universal Health Card, LLC, 660 F.3d 943 (6th Cir. 2011) (approving pre-certification striking of class allegations where legal defect cannot be cured by discovery)
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021) (Article III requires concrete, particularized injury; mere risk of future harm insufficient for monetary-relief standing)
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013) (Rule 23 demands rigorous analysis and proof for class certification)
Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (Rule 23(b)(2) unsuitable where class members would be entitled to individualized monetary awards or monetary relief is not incidental)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (standing requires concrete and particularized injury that is actual or imminent)
Daffin v. Ford Motor Co., 458 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing inclusion of non‑manifesting class members in certain product-defect classes)
Bearden v. Honeywell Int'l Inc., 720 F. Supp. 2d 932 (M.D. Tenn. 2010) (district court declined to strike class where alleged defect had manifested for all purchasers)