Jones v. International Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO Local 158, 158 C, 158 S & 158 RA, 671 F. App'x 10

Randolph Jones, pro se, sued his union and individual union officials for discrimination, retaliation, failure to grieve, and NLRA violations, invoking Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and New York law.
The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, dismissing claims as either barred by collateral estoppel, time‑barred, or without merit; Jones appealed.
The court relied on a prior suit Jones brought against his employer, Onondaga County Resource Recovery Agency (OCRRA), in which the district court found no reasonable fact‑finder could conclude the employer and union’s collaborative decision was race‑motivated (Jones v. OCRRA, 973 F. Supp. 2d 159).
The Second Circuit reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo and considered whether collateral estoppel barred Jones’s discrimination claims and whether other claims were properly dismissed.
The Court affirmed: discrimination claims were precluded by collateral estoppel; retaliation and Taylor Law claims were dismissed on the merits for the reasons stated by the district court; the NLRA claim was waived on appeal and alternatively dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because OCRRA is a state-created public benefit corporation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether discrimination claims are barred by collateral estoppel	Jones argued his union conduct discrimination claims could proceed despite the prior OCRRA litigation	Defendants argued the earlier decision resolved the discrimination issue and precludes relitigation	Collateral estoppel applied; discrimination claims dismissed
Whether retaliation and Taylor Law claims survive summary judgment	Jones contended retaliation and Taylor Law claims were viable	Defendants argued those claims lacked merit or supporting evidence	Court affirmed district court’s dismissal on the merits
Whether NLRA claim remains	Jones asserted NLRA violations by the union/employer	Defendants argued NLRA inapplicable to OCRRA (a public entity) and claim was not preserved on appeal	Waived on appeal; alternatively dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because NLRA does not apply to state/public subdivisions
Standard for affirming summary judgment	Jones relied on his factual allegations to oppose summary judgment	Defendants relied on absence of genuine dispute and legal defenses (preclusion/statute limitations)	Summary judgment reviewed de novo; conclusory allegations insufficient to defeat it

Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep’t, 706 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary judgment standard and de novo review)
Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2010) (conclusory allegations cannot defeat summary judgment)
Fletcher v. Atex, Inc., 68 F.3d 1451 (2d Cir. 1995) (same)
Leon v. Murphy, 988 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1993) (appellate affirmance may rest on any record-supported basis)
Jones v. Onondaga Cty. Res. Recovery Agency, 973 F. Supp. 2d 159 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) (prior judgment finding no race‑motivated decision)
Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Simon, 310 F.3d 280 (2d Cir. 2002) (doctrine of collateral estoppel overview)
Proctor v. LeClaire, 715 F.3d 402 (2d Cir. 2013) (elements for collateral estoppel)
Ball v. A.O. Smith Corp., 451 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting collateral estoppel elements)
Wyly v. Weiss, 697 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 2012) (issue preclusion across different claims)
LeBlanc‑Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 1995) (preclusion despite non‑identity of parties)
Ford v. D.C. 37 Union Local 1549, 579 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2009) (NLRA inapplicable to public‑employer claims in federal court)
NLRB v. Nat. Gas Util. of Hawkins Cty., 402 U.S. 600 (1971) (definition of political subdivision for NLRA purposes)