Jones v. Cretic Energy Services, LLC
149 F. Supp. 3d 761
S.D. Tex.2015Background
- Plaintiff Andrew Jones sued Cretic Energy Services under the FLSA seeking unpaid overtime as a collective action on behalf of coil tubing field crew members paid a salary and/or day-rate.
- Jones worked as a Coil Tubing Pump Operator; he alleges operators and other crew members (including some supervisors) worked >40 hrs/wk and were misclassified as exempt.
- Plaintiff moved for conditional certification and court-approved notice to all current/former employees who worked on coil tubing crews within three years prior to the order.
- Defendant opposed, arguing the proposed class is overly broad because it includes supervisors with different duties and possible different exemption defenses (motor carrier vs. executive), and objected to aspects of the proposed notice (email/phone collection, posting, reminders, counsel contact).
- The court applied the two-stage Lusardi notice-stage standard used in this district and found plaintiff met the lenient showing required at the notice stage via declarations from operators and one supervisor.
- The court conditionally certified the collective: all current and former Cretic employees who worked on coil tubing crews from December 9, 2012 to present and received a salary and/or additional compensation; it ordered production of contact info (including emails and phone numbers), authorized workplace posting, a 60-day opt-in period, and allowed reminder notices.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conditional certification / "similarly situated" (operators vs supervisors) | Jones: crew members (operators and supervisors) work side-by-side, same hours and duties, uniformly paid salary/day-rate and misclassified | Cretic: supervisors have managerial duties and different exemptions; duties differ materially and present conflicts of interest | Granted conditional certification; evidence showed day-to-day duties did not vary substantially and exemptions are merits defenses not dispositive at notice stage |
| Scope of class period | Jones sought three years before filing; amended to three years before notice approval | Cretic argued the proper period is three years before court-approved notice | Court approved three-year period running from date of court-approved notice (as agreed by parties) |
| Notice content and methods (emails, phone numbers, posting at worksites) | Needed to facilitate effective notice to remote, transient oilfield workers | Objected as unnecessary/invasive | Court ordered production of contact info including emails/phones and authorized posting at worksites as reasonably tailored and necessary |
| Reminder notices and consent form handling / costs | Jones: reminders needed given remote work; consent forms may be returned to plaintiffs' counsel | Cretic: reminders unnecessary; consent forms should go to court; opt-ins should be warned about potential costs | Court allowed reminder notices and submission of consent forms to plaintiffs' counsel; declined to include warning about potential costs |
Key Cases Cited
- Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (U.S. 1989) (district courts may facilitate notice for representative actions)
- Mooney v. Aramco Services Co., 54 F.3d 1207 (5th Cir. 1995) (describes two-step Lusardi notice/decertification approach)
- Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 118 F.R.D. 351 (D.N.J. 1987) (articulates two-stage notice then decertification framework)
- Sandoz v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 553 F.3d 913 (5th Cir. 2008) (discusses notice-stage standard)
- Baldridge v. SBC Communications, Inc., 404 F.3d 930 (5th Cir. 2005) (district courts may limit scope of FLSA collective actions)
- LaChapelle v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 513 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975) (distinguishes Rule 23 opt-out from §216(b) opt-in procedures)