Jones v. Brown-Marino
2017 IL App (1st) 152852
Ill. App. Ct.2017Background
- After the 2015 Broadview election, plaintiff Sherman C. Jones (village president) lost the trustee majority; defendants (four trustees) enacted a “Legislative Counsel Ordinance” allowing trustees to retain outside counsel for drafting ordinances, contracts, opinions, and other legislative duties.
- Jones sued in his official capacity seeking a declaration that the ordinance (and a related Meeting Ordinance) was void and moved to disqualify the firm Ancel Glink, which trustees had hired to provide legislative services.
- Jones argued the ordinance usurped the village attorney’s statutory duties, unlawfully divesting executive power and creating ethical conflicts because Ancel Glink represented other parties adverse to two minority trustees (McGrier and Turner).
- The trial court denied Jones’s motion to disqualify Ancel Glink and later granted defendants’ combined section 2-615/2-619 motion to dismiss Jones’s complaint.
- On appeal, the court reviewed the disqualification ruling for abuse of discretion (with de novo review for statutory/ordinance interpretation) and affirmed dismissal and denial of disqualification.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Disqualification of Ancel Glink under Rule 1.7 | Ancel Glink has concurrent conflicts because it represents parties adverse to two trustees and therefore cannot serve as legislative counsel | No concurrent conflict: (a) Jones lacks standing to challenge the trustees’ counsel choice; (b) ordinance is permissive and Ancel Glink’s prior matters are concluded | Denial affirmed: Jones lacks standing; no showing firm represents the absent trustees in a way triggering Rule 1.7 concurrent-conflict disqualification |
| Facial invalidity of Legislative Counsel Ordinance (separation/usurpation) | Ordinance unlawfully divests the village attorney of exclusive duty to draft ordinances and usurps executive powers | Ordinance expressly states it will not usurp village attorney; board may amend code and authorize outside counsel for legislative advice | Dismissal affirmed: ordinance lawful; village code duties are not exclusive and board may amend duties |
| Claim that ordinance creates impermissible long-term financial commitment | Ordinance’s indefinite duration ties hands of future boards in violation of Municipal Code restriction | Ordinance creates no continuing contractual obligation; each request for counsel is an on-demand contract; future boards can amend | Dismissal affirmed: no prohibited long-term obligation; statute not violated |
| Challenge based on lack of budget appropriation | Ordinance is void because no appropriation exists for outside counsel fees | Plaintiff challenges ordinance itself, not any specific contract/payment; lack of appropriation does not render the enabling ordinance facially invalid | Dismissal affirmed: facial challenge fails; improper vehicle to attack appropriations absent specific contract/payment dispute |
Key Cases Cited
- Schwartz v. Cortelloni, 177 Ill. 2d 166 (1997) (standard of review for disqualification motions)
- La Salle Nat’l Bank v. City Suites, 325 Ill. App. 3d 780 (2001) (de novo review for ordinance interpretation)
- Evink v. Pekin Ins. Co., 122 Ill. App. 3d 246 (1984) (plaintiff lacks standing to disqualify opposing counsel absent showing of harm)
- Sampson v. Graves, 304 Ill. App. 3d 961 (1999) (municipal officials may seek legal advice from sources other than village attorney)
- Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 374 Ill. App. 3d 1098 (2007) (facial challenge to ordinance requires showing invalidity under any set of circumstances)